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ABSTRACT
IDPAL - A PARTIALLY-ADIABATIC ENERGY-EFFICIENT
LOGIC FAMILY: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS TO SECURE
COMPUTING
Mihail T. Cutitaru
Old Dominion University, 2014
Director: Dr. Lee A. Belfore, II
Low-power circuits and issues associated with them have gained a significant amount
of attention in recent years due to the boom in portable electronic devices. Historically,
low-power operation relied heavily on technology scaling and reduced operating voltage,
however this trend has been slowing down recently due to the increased power density
on chips. This dissertation introduces a new very-low power partially-adiabatic logic
family called Input-Decoupled Partially-Adiabatic Logic (IDPAL) with applications in
low-power circuits. Experimental results show that IDPAL reduces energy usage by 79%
compared to equivalent CMOS implementations and by 25% when compared to the best
adiabatic implementation. Experiments ranging from a simple buffer/inverter up to a 32bit multiplier are explored and result in consistent energy savings, showing that IDPAL
could be a viable candidate for a low-power circuit implementation.
This work also shows an application of IDPAL to secure low-power circuits against
power analysis attacks. It is often assumed that encryption algorithms are perfectly secure
against attacks, however, most times attacks using side channels on the hardware imple
mentation of an encryption operation are not investigated. Power analysis attacks are a
subset of side channel attacks and can be implemented by measuring the power used by
a circuit during an encryption operation in order to obtain secret information from the
circuit under attack. Most of the previously proposed solutions for power analysis attacks
use a large amount of power and are unsuitable for a low-power application. The almostequal energy consumption for any given input in an IDPAL circuit suggests that this logic
family is a good candidate for securing low-power circuits again power analysis attacks.
Experimental results ranging from small circuits to large multipliers are performed and
the power-analysis attack resistance of IDPAL is investigated. Results show that IDPAL
circuits are not only low-power but also the most secure against power analysis attacks
when compared to other adiabatic low-power circuits.

Finally, a hybrid adiabatic-CMOS microprocessor design is presented. The proposed
microprocessor uses IDPAL for the implementation of circuits with high switching ac
tivity (e.g. ALU) and CMOS logic for other circuits (e.g. memory, controller). An
adiabatic-CMOS interface for transforming adiabatic signals to square-wave signals is
presented and issues associated with a hybrid implementation and their solutions are also
discussed.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The tremendous success of the microprocessor industry has been driven by the scala
bility of the transistors over the past 50 years according to Moore’s predictions [5]. Heat
dissipation has become a major issue in circuit design given the high transistor density,
even in the area of low power design. The usual solution has heavily relied on reducing the
operating voltage with each decrease in feature size, but current processes are approach
ing the limits of scaling due to limitations on the threshold voltage of each technology
node. Landauer noted [6] that the minimum energy dissipation per switching event will
ideally be no less than &Tln2 J, where k is Boltzmann’s constant and T is the operating
temperature in degrees Kelvin. Many techniques are currently in use to reduce the power
consumption of circuits, but the current value for energy dissipation per bit erased is still
almost three orders of magnitude larger than the theoretical limit calculated by Landauer.
This prompts for new solutions to reduce the energy dissipation in low power micropro
cessors in order to extend the battery life of devices.
Continued development and miniaturization of transistor features has allowed for a
surge in the number of portable devices used daily by society. Current devices provide
more processing power than full-size desktops from ten years ago, which has prompted
some people to move their digital identities to these devices due to many security fea
tures embedded in applications used. In recent years, extensive research has shown
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that encryption modules in cellular phones, smart cards, and other specialized hard
ware are prone to attacks that use side channels for extraction of secret information
[47, 62,66, 72,79, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85]. Side-channel attacks are attacks that gather secret
information by exploiting channels other than the traditional communication channels in
these devices. There is no indication in literature that any hardware security measures
are implemented in current portable electronic devices, leaving them exposed for possible
attacks because of the amount of information that an attacker stands to gain from a suc
cessful attempt. This problem suggests that power analysis attack countermeasures would
be a valuable feature for low power electronic devices,

1.1

Review of Complementary Metal-Oxide Semiconductor Devices

The workhorse of the semiconductor industry for more than 50 years has been the
Complementary Metal-Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) process. CMOS circuits are built
using two kinds of transistors: PMOS (p-channel metal-oxide-semiconductor field-effect
transistor) and NMOS (n-channel metal-oxide-semiconductor field-effect transistor), ar
ranged in complementary networks. The PMOS networks implement the desired function
and are called pull-up networks (PUN) and the NMOS networks implement the comple
mentary function and are called pull-down networks (PDN). CMOS circuits are digital
circuits and, as such, take values at either of the two discrete potentials: High (‘1’ or
Vdd) and Low (‘O’ or GND). Because of these two distinct values, charge is always be
ing shuffled from the source {Vdd) to the output nodes to change it to a ‘1’ or from the
output nodes to the GND to change the value to a ‘O’. Furthermore, when no signals are
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changing, CMOS circuits consume very little power, making them an attractive choice for
implementation of electronic circuits.
Energy dissipation in CMOS devices occurs due to three distinct components:
static/leakage, short-circuit, and dynamic [7]. Static power dissipation occurs when the
value of a node is kept constant and is due to the reverse current of the PN junctions in a
transistor. Leakage power is due to the subthreshold conduction current present between
the source and drain of a MOS device. The subthreshold conduction current can be de
creased by increasing the threshold voltage, although this also leads to the need for wider
devices and higher dynamic energy dissipation. In larger technology nodes, the contri
bution of leakage energy dissipation is very small, however, with decreased feature sizes
in modem processes, this component increases exponentially. The second component is
the contribution from short circuit energy dissipation, which occurs when the output node
switches values and both the PUN and PDN are briefly conducting at the same time form
ing a path between Vdd and GND. This is a very short event and has a small contribution
to the overall energy dissipation. The last and largest component is the dynamic energy
dissipation, also known as active losses. This occurs when a given combination of inputs
causes the output node to switch values, either by charging or discharging. It is widely
known that for a rail-to-rail voltage of Vdd and output node capacitance C, the energy re
quired to bring a node from GND to Vdd is £ = CV2, with half of this energy dissipated in
the transistor network as heat during charging. Since this component has the largest con
tribution to the overall power dissipation, the main focus of low power design has been to
reduce it with every new technology node.

1.1.1

Low Power Devices and Techniques

Historically, CMOS circuits have been employed where low power consumption is
desired. In many applications where the systems are operated at low frequencies, CMOS
has performed well. The subject of low-power has not seen much interest for many years
except for a small subset of devices such as medical implants. It was not until the prolif
eration of portable electronic devices and the continued technology scaling that the focus
has shifted to low power design and challenges associated with it. Low power design
was not an issue earlier since the device density was much smaller than it is now. Given
Moore’s Law, we expect to have a larger number of faster transistors packaged in the same
area, providing an opportunity for new low power technologies to allow the trend to con
tinue by providing more efficient heat dissipation and reducing the thermal impacts that
result in circuit deterioration.
The miniaturization of transistor feature sizes has allowed for low power circuits to
flourish and be used in many new areas. As an example, in the recent years we have seen
explosive growth in the use of portable electronic devices, especially in the cell phone
arena. It is now possible to check email, browse the Internet, and do many other useful
activities from a handheld device, which was not possible a decade ago. However, this
has also brought attention to many existing constraints, e.g. we want smaller, lighter,
and more powerful devices than ever before. Traditional solutions, such as increasing the
battery size (and consequently its weight) to provide longer battery life are not feasible [7].
Indeed, companies market external batteries to extend the battery life of a portable device
by a few hours. However, this does not change the fact that with regular use, a modem
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smartphone lasts less than a day without needing a charge. The general conclusion is that
batteries alone will not solve the low power problem and alternate solutions are highly
desirable.
One of the easiest and most effective ways to reduce dynamic dissipation is by reduc
ing the operating voltage of a circuit, since energy dissipation is proportional to the square
of the operating voltage (E — CV2). Many trade-offs are associated with voltage reduc
tion. Most significantly, a loss in performance is observed since transistors are slower
because of the lower operating voltages. This is due to the non-linear scaling of the tran
sistor threshold voltage with the operating voltage in order to avoid leakage current. Noise
immunity is also reduced given a lower voltage swing. Additionally, level converters are
required in order to interface low swing signals to full swing signals.
Some of the other techniques for lower power are to reduce parasitic capacitance,
switching frequency, and leakage and static currents. Reducing parasitic capacitance is
one of the standard steps in modem Computer-Aided Design (CAD) software, although
a very thorough understanding of the full circuit design process is required. Switching
frequency reduction has the same effect as reducing capacitance as it is best applied to
nodes with high capacitance, so nodes with smaller capacitances can only see a small
reduction in power consumption. Reducing the switching frequency also has positive
impact on the reliability of a chip. Static and leakage currents are the most difficult to
control since they are highly dependent on the process technology, although some level of
control can be achieved by transistor sizing and layout [7].

All low power techniques attempt to reduce the energy dissipation by making strate
gic changes to CMOS circuit parameters; however, they do not solve the issue that energy
dissipation is a function of how CMOS circuits operate. A revolutionary change in how
circuits are built, clocked, and powered is necessary if any additional reductions in energy
dissipation are to be expected. Several other types of logic families have been explored
by the research community to replace CMOS logic for low power circuits, one of which
is adiabatic computing. Adiabatic computing works under the principle that if signal
voltages are changed gradually to evaluate logic functions and then gradually reclaim
ing charge when done, resistive losses are reduced and average power dissipation can be
greatly reduced. This gradual charging avoids the high resistance imposed by the transis
tor network and the current peak associated with it. Adiabatic logic requires a different
design flow, custom libraries, and special considerations in order for the circuits to operate
properly, but it provides a significant reduction in energy consumption.

1.2 Hardware Security and Power Analysis Attacks

The second area explored in this dissertation is hardware security. Security of com
putation is usually incorporated at the algorithmic level in software, with most encryption
algorithms being very secure from an algorithmic and mathematical standpoint. Attacks
on mainstream encryption algorithms have proven very difficult and many security pre
cautions have been taken for these algorithms to be secure at the software level. However,
hardware implementations of these encryption algorithms may not always be secure and
there is only a small amount of research in this area. Some of the applications of these

encryption tasks are user DD, phone card, secure authentication tokens, smart cards, and,
more recently, bank cards. Oftentimes these circuits are not secured from attacks that
could be staged using non-traditional communication channels, also known as side chan
nels. This kind of security attack is also called “implementation attacks” as their main
focus is the physical implementation of otherwise-secure algorithms. As society moves
towards using more and more portable devices to conduct everyday business, hardware se
curity becomes vastly more important. In recent years, we have also observed an increase
in the use of smart cards being used as bank cards, mass transit cards, chips in biometric
passports, and other applications [82], which makes them more prone to hardware attacks.
Side-channel attacks take advantage of the power used, time elapsed, electromagnetic ra
diation emitted, and even sound waves from computer hardware during computation in
order to extract secret information. These side-channel attacks are especially important
in secure environments, e.g. military, banks, corporations, and require using systems that
have built-in hardware security.
Attacks on cryptographic devices are mainly categorized based on two criteria: 1)
invasive vs. non-invasive and 2) passive vs. active. Invasive attacks are the most powerful
because there is no limit on what can be done to the device. Invasive attacks also require
an exact copy of the device under attack, detailed implementation knowledge, and very
expensive tools. Non-invasive attacks can be implemented with relatively inexpensive
equipment and pose a more serious threat to the security of cryptographic devices because
this attack leaves no detectable evidence of tampering. Active attacks are implemented by
an attacker tampering with the device in order for it to behave abnormally, which can
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lead it to reveal secret information. This kind of attacks are very powerful, but require
detail knowledge and a sophisticated setup. Passive attacks, on the other hand, are staged
during normal operation of a cryptographic device and are based on observing physical
properties of the device. They are implemented using readily-available hardware and
software, are simple to set up, and are the least costly. In this work, the focus is on
power analysis attacks, which fall in the category of non-invasive passive attacks, and
their countermeasures.
Power analysis attacks rely on the fact that CMOS circuits will consume a different
amount of energy for different inputs to a circuit. This unequal energy consumption can
be exploited by an attacker to reveal the secret key by measuring the power usage for
several inputs. For example, presenting a certain set of inputs can result in an increased
probability of correctly guessing part of the secret key, thus weakening the encryption and
potentially compromising devices. Power analysis attacks can be implemented even on
very noisy power traces or without any knowledge of the device under test, which makes
this kind of attack of great concern in the future of computing hardware. Attacks can be
staged on circuits of any size and power characteristics, ranging from a personal computer
to smart cards used in the banking industry to implanted medical devices. Current power
analysis countermeasures are mainly aimed at circuits that are not limited in their energy
budget, i.e. non-battery-operated devices, and little research exists in the area of power
analysis attacks countermeasures on low power devices. An example of energy-limited
devices with a need for hardware security are implantable medical devices, which have
limited energy due to their size and the consequences of power analysis attacks could be

9
fatal.

1.3

Problem Statement

The abundance of low power portable devices in use today continues to grow and this
growth is expected to continue at least at its current rate. Circuit designers need to devise
new techniques to make these devices use less power while delivering a higher quality
user experience with the same or longer battery life. Recent developments in the areas
of sensors, implantable medical devices, and wearable computing (e.g. smart watches,
Google Glass) prompt for new low power solutions at small sizes. Devices with very
low power dissipation could also allow for deployment of systems with solar cells as a
power source, making the systems self-sustaining and decreasing the interval between
battery replacements. As the traditional energy dissipation reduction rate slows down,
new avenues for reducing energy dissipation in computing circuits need to be explored.
At the same time, as portable devices get even more integrated into our everyday lives,
privacy and security issues become more important. As more and more users move their
digital lives onto portable devices and continue assuming that hardware implementation
of security algorithms are secure, security breaches can prove more devastating than ever
before. Many security features are in place for protection against software attacks, e.g.
viruses and other malware, but there are no indications of any hardware security coun
termeasures implemented in these circuits. Given the possible consequences of a power
analysis attack on a cryptographic circuit, it is necessary to make circuits resistant to this
type of attacks.
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These two separate problems have not been investigated as one in the literature, but
given the miniaturization of circuits and their tighter integration in daily lives, power
analysis attacks on low power circuits become a reality with possibly devastating conse
quences. The few proposed solutions to this problem either solve the low power problem
or the power analysis problem, but not both. A solution that covers both issues is needed
in order to protect low power circuits from this kind of attacks.

1.4 Dissertation Contributions

This work aims to provide a novel solution that provides lower power operation and
resistance to power analysis encryption attacks by introducing a new very low power
logic family named Input Decoupled Partially-Adiabatic Logic (IDPAL). IDPAL is a new
adiabatic logic family that uses a two-phase sinusoidal Power Clock and has very low
variation in energy dissipation between input values. IDPAL shows promising results in
reducing the energy used in computations by up to 79% compared to standard CMOS
implementations and up to 25% compared to next-best adiabatic implementation. It also
increases the resistance against power analysis attacks when compared to state-of-the-art
secure logic families. A proof-of-concept hybrid adiabatic-CMOS microprocessor design
using IDPAL is presented. Issues associated with a hybrid dual-rail microprocessor design
and adiabatic-CMOS interfacing are discussed.
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1.5

Dissertation Overview

The rest of the dissertation follows a traditional format. Chapter II gives a back
ground of CMOS computing, explains the basics of adiabatic computing, and discusses
some of the most well-known adiabatic logic families. It also gives some background
in hardware security, power analysis attacks, and existing countermeasures. Chapter III
presents IDPAL, explains its operation principle, and provides simulation results from
circuits of different sizes. Chapter IV describes the application of IDPAL to hardware
security, specifically as a power analysis countermeasure, using circuits of different sizes.
Chapter V describes the implementation of a hybrid adiabatic-CMOS microprocessor us
ing EDPAL for the implementation of adiabatic blocks. Chapter VI presents some areas of
future work and other applications for EDPAL and Chapter VII summarizes the contribu
tions of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS
This chapter gives a background on the basics of adiabatic logic, its operating prin
ciples, and clocking schemes. It also presents some of main adiabatic logic families that
have shown promising results in terms of energy efficiency, both theoretically and dur
ing testing of any fabricated chips. The second half of the chapter provides an overview
of power analysis attacks and briefly presents existing countermeasures at the hardware
level. Several non-adiabatic dual-rail solutions are discussed, along with their respective
advantages and disadvantages.

n.l

Background in Adiabatic Computing

Conventional CMOS circuits dissipate half of the input energy during gate charging
and store the other half in the output node capacitance when a logic value changes. This
can be illustrated using the CMOS inverter and its equivalent circuit in Fig. 1 as an ex
ample. When the input is switched from High to Low, the PMOS transistor turns ON and
charges the output capacitor, where the output capacitor (C) models the fanout of the gate.
When the input switches to High, the charge stored in C is discharged through the NMOS
transistor to GND. During the charging process, a charge of Q = CVdd is transferred from
the source to the output, where Vdd is the supply voltage. The supplied energy is then
calculated as
^supplied = QVdd — C^dd-

0)
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The current flow during charging is given by

(2)

where R is the equivalent transistor resistance, and the power is calculated as

(3)

The amount of energy stored in C can be calculated by integrating the power over time
and is given by
Estored

(4)

This result shows that only half of the input energy is stored in the output capacitor, while
the other half is dissipated in the transistor network during charging. Furthermore, when
the output changes values, the energy stored in C is not recycled back to the source but is
dissipated in the NMOS transistor network. Energy dissipation in CMOS circuits is due
to how these circuits are driven, i.e. using square-wave clocks, and dissipation of stored
energy as heat when the output value switches to a Low, reducing the energy efficiency of
the circuit.
An alternative to CMOS logic is a adiabatic switching, which ideally operates as a
reversible thermodynamic process, without loss or gain of energy. Adiabatic computa
tion works by making very small changes in energy levels of nodes in circuits sufficiently
slow, ideally resulting in no energy dissipation during charging and recovering the en
ergy from the output capacitance when discharging. However, practical implementations
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Fig. 1: CMOS inverter and its equivalent circuit.

of adiabatic circuits contain some losses, even if the circuits are driven at a small fre
quency. There exist two types of adiabatic computations: fully-adiabatic (circuit operates
slower, loses arbitrarily little energy per operation, and almost all of the input energy
is recovered) and partially-adiabatic (some energy is recovered and some is lost to irre
versible, non-adiabatic operations). While fully-adiabatic circuits are very attractive from
a reversible logic perspective and are most suitable for the implementation of reversible
circuits, most existing adiabatic circuit designs are partially-adiabatic because of their
simpler implementations and smaller circuit area.
Adiabatic switching attempts to minimize the energy wasted during charging by using
a more gradual charge delivery system which is more efficient at lower frequencies. A
gradual charge transfer avoids the large current peak of Vdd/R and reduces the power
loss during output switching. Adiabatic circuits replace the square-wave clock with a
time-varying Power Clock (PC), which supplies both power and clocking information to
circuits. Unlike CMOS circuits, adiabatic circuits normally require more than one clock
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phase to operate correctly. The most common types of PC’s used in adiabatic circuits are
4-phase trapezoidal and 1- or 2-phase sinusoidal oscillators.
Because of their continuous time-varying nature, the outputs of an adiabatic gate
charge and discharge on every PC cycle, having an activity factor a = 1. Given this high
activity factor, adiabatic logic circuits maintain their advantage over CMOS circuits and
are more suitable for circuits with moderate to high switching activity, e.g. arithmetic cir
cuits. This continuous switching forces them to be operated in a micro-pipelined fashion,
most often using multiple PC phases.
Adiabatic circuits work by charging the output nodes for part of the clock cycle, al
lowing the next clock phase to sample the output, then recovering the charge from the
output node capacitances. The number of PC’s depends on the adiabatic family and the
type of oscillator used. In general, trapezoidal PC’s use 4 phases, although a few designs
with a single phase and some with 8 phases exist. Trapezoidal PC’s have 4 phases of op
eration: Wait, Charge, Hold, and Recover. Sinusoidal PC’s usually use 2 phases, but some
technologies have additional circuitry to achieve single-phase operation. Sinusoidal PC ’s
have two operating phases: Charge and Recover. An example of the 4-phase trapezoidal
and 2-phase sinusoidal PC’s is shown in Fig. 2.

II. 1.1

Benefits and Disadvantages of Adiabatic Logic

Adiabatic logic circuits have a several important advantages over CMOS circuits.
First, they offer very low energy consumption at a frequency of up to several hundred
MHz for circuits with a moderate to high activity factor. While operation at higher speeds
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Fig. 2: 2-phase sinusoidal and 4-phase trapezoidal PC's with each stage marked for the
first phase.

is possible as demonstrated in a commercial chip [15], the advantages of adiabatic switch
ing diminish as the power clock charging time approaches the MOS transistor charging
time. Therefore, adiabatic circuits would be more suitable for use in applications that
operate at frequencies below 1 GHz.
Another advantage of adiabatic logic is its inherent micro-pipelining. Unlike tradi
tional CMOS circuits where the value of an output needs to be stored in a latch when the
inputs change, adiabatic logic allows for a micro-pipelined approach, where each output
is dynamically buffered and stored for one clock cycle. This allows for an adiabatic sys
tem to operate without the use of latches since the intermediary outputs are generated and
immediately sampled by the next stage. Most adiabatic technologies do not have special
latch circuits due to their micro-pipelining, although some flip-flop designs for adiabatic
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circuits have been proposed in [21 ]—[23]. These designs were not true flip-flops, but were
based on adiabatic buffers without any special circuitry for holding a constant value. Tra
ditional CMOS latches and flip-flops can still be used for outputs at the adiabatic-CMOS
interface.
CMOS circuits are limited in their maximum operating frequency by the critical path
of a given circuit. A critical path does not exist in adiabatic logic circuits as micro
pipelining allows the evaluation of only one gate per stage. The PC enforces that input
signals are valid as soon as a gate starts to evaluate its outputs. Delay due to the evaluation
of complex gates with large input stacks is also not an issue for adiabatic circuits since the
evaluation of inputs will take place before the outputs start evaluating. Adiabatic circuits
are also not constrained by setup and hold times as the next gate will only evaluate after
the outputs of the current gate are stable (when the PC is at its peak).
Adiabatic switching does not have as rigorous a constraint on voltage scaling as does
CMOS switching [18]. There is a tradeoff between speed and power consumption in
CMOS circuits, therefore the voltage can only be reduced to a level to which timing con
straints are not violated based on the critical path. On the other hand, adiabatic switching
does not have any timing constraints other than the fixed gate delay due to the threshold
voltage of the charging transistors.
Another advantage of adiabatic circuits is that it strongly reduces the effects of elec
tromigration. Electromigration is the wear-out process on lines carrying currents with a
strong current density and is a predicting factor in the mean time to failure of electronic
components. The effect is more likely to occur on power supply lines in CMOS circuits

18
where unidirectional currents are strong. In cases where the current flow is bidirectional,
such as adiabatic circuits, the effects of electromigration are greatly reduced. Reducing
the effects of electromigration contributes to a longer mean time to failure and also allows
the clock lines to be narrower, which reduces capacitance and energy consumption.
Adiabatic circuits also have some limitations. They are dual-rail circuits by design,
which requires both an input and its complement and produces the output and its comple
ment. Dual-rail circuits often have up to double the area requirements of single rail cir
cuits and require special care during layout for interconnects. As an example, the CMOS
2-input NAND gate can be built using 4 transistors (2 PMOS and 2 NMOS), whereas the
smallest adiabatic implementation using the 2N2P logic family [8] contains 6 transistors
(4 NMOS for function implementation and 2 PMOS for charging).
Adiabatic logic circuits more often than not use more than one clock phase for op
eration. While there are a couple of logic families that use only one clock phase (e.g.
TSEL[11], CAL[10]), they also use auxiliary signals to make one-phase operation pos
sible. Most sinusoidal adiabatic logic families use two sinusoidal clock phases, whereas
the trapezoidal families use four phases. The use of multiple clock phases adds more area
and routing constraints to the circuit compared to a single-phase clock and raises issues of
clock synchronization across multiples phases. As the output of each stage in an adiabatic
micro-pipelined circuit feeds into another stage with a different phase, the multiple clock
phases have to be exactly spaced in order to compute a result properly and increase energy
efficiency.
Inherent micro-pipelining can also be a disadvantage of adiabatic logic if proper care
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is not taken to buffer signals in circuits that have multiple evaluation stages. Insertion
of extra buffers adds to the circuit area, increases capacitance, and has an impact on the
design flow as the buffers have to be accounted for in the design process. The number
of transistors used in buffer circuits necessary to translate a CMOS design to an adiabatic
design depends on the chosen adiabatic family and the particular implementation of a
circuit. Values for the number of transistors for each adiabatic family investigate were not
available from the original authors, but experimental values for large arithmetic circuits
were found to range from 25% to 35% of total transistor count.

II.1.2

Summary of Adiabatic Families

Adiabatic logic families can be divided into two main categories: ones that use diodes
and ones that do not. Most modem adiabatic logic families are diode-less as they are
more energy-efficient because the voltage drop across the diode in older families results
in lower efficiencies. There have been a number of adiabatic logic families proposed
[8]-[14], [16, 17, 19, 20], [23]-[27], but only a few of them have been successful in
gaining recognition and usage in the adiabatic logic research community. Most of these
families use a trapezoidal PC and only a few use a 2-phase sinusoidal PC, even though
the generation of a sinusoidal PC is more energy efficient than a trapezoidal one. Some of
these adiabatic families, their operation, and advantages and disadvantages are succinctly
described below.
2N2P: This partially-adiabatic logic family introduced in [8] uses a four-phase trape
zoidal PC and the buffer/inverter implementation is shown in Fig. 3. The buffer/inverter

uses a simple NMOS pull-down network structure and contains a low number of transis
tors. The cross-coupled PMOSs (PI and P2) are a feature of almost all adiabatic logic
families and ensure that the voltages at the PMOS transistors’ drain terminals (out and
out) are always complementary. Furthermore, the PMOS transistors provide a pathway
to recover charge back to the power clock. The two NMOS transistors implement the
buffer and inverter functionality by using a complementary pull-down network. Their
functionality can be expanded by using a PDN structure to implement any function and
its complement.

PC

PI

out

out

Fig. 3: 2N2P buffer/inverter circuit.

The operation of a 2N2P gate follows a traditional trapezoidal PC sequence. When
PC is at GND, during the WAIT stage, the inputs are evaluated and the corresponding
output is pulled to GND. In the next stage (EVALUATE), once Vpc >

\V tp \

(the PMOS

threshold voltage), the other output is ramped up following the PC up to Vdd- Since the
inputs are stable throughout the four clock phases, the output that is initially at GND does

21
not change values while the other charges adiabatically to Vdd- During the next stage
(HOLD), the outputs are held at complementary values in order for the next stage of gates
to evaluate. In the last phase (RECOVER), the High output is ramped down to GND by
following the PC and the energy stored in that node is recovered until Vpc =

\V tp \-

If the

inputs change and cause a change at the outputs, the remaining energy will be discarded
as the outputs switch values. If the inputs remain constant, the remaining energy will be
used in charging the outputs during the next clock cycle, thereby reducing the amount of
energy lost in the system.
2N2P achieves very good energy efficiency compared to CMOS (up to 57% less), but
suffers from possible floating output nodes during the HOLD stage which reduces energy
efficiency. Another disadvantage is that it uses four clock phases, adding more area and
capacitance in layout. And lastly, the use of a trapezoidal PC allows for a more linear
charge delivery, however, the generation of a trapezoidal PC reduces the energy efficiency
of the system since it is significantly more difficult to generate than a sinusoidal PC.
2N-2N2P: The 2N-2N2P [8] logic family is an extension of 2N2P and has the same
timing and clock phases. The difference is that it adds a Static Random Access Memory
(SRAM)-like structure that allows for the outputs to be non-floating for all PC phases
(Fig. 4). One of the disadvantages of using this SRAM-like structure is that it limits
the energy efficiency at operating speeds higher than 100 MHz. In large circuit simula
tions, 2N-2N2P achieved an energy efficiency of 63% less than equivalent CMOS circuits,
slightly better than 2N2P circuits.
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Fig. 4: 2N-2N2P buffer/inverter circuit.

Clocked Adiabatic Logic (CAL): CAL [10] is a single-phase partially-adiabatic logic
family containing a SRAM cell at its core, similar to 2N-2N2R Modifications from 2N2N2P include the two NMOS control transistors inserted between the output nodes and
the input pull-down networks (Fig. 5) and controlled by two complementary square-wave
auxiliary signals (CX and CX). The two signals allow for single-phase PC operation by
controlling alternate gates with alternate auxiliary signals. The main advantage of this
family is the use of a single-phase PC, allowing it to use a classical CMOS-like clock
distribution scheme. The main disadvantage is the ability to take new inputs only at half
the PC frequency due to the auxiliary signals. Given the fact that CAL uses a one phase
PC with two additional signals makes it not a true single phase adiabatic logic family,
however it has seen some use in large circuits in adiabatic literature [34].
True Single-Phase Energy-Recovery Logic (TSEL): TSEL [11] is a single-phase
partially adiabatic logic family with features similar to the 2N2P family. It uses a single
phase sinusoidal PC with cascades composed of alternating PMOS and NMOS gates. The
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Fig. 5: CAL buffer/inverter circuit.

structure of a TSEL PMOS buffer/inverter is shown in Fig. 6. Each TSEL gate contains a
reference voltage (either V r p or

V rw ,

depending on the type of transistors used) as a bias

voltage, which is a distinctive feature of this family. TSEL uses pre-charging of gates in
order to achieve single-phase operation and contains two distinct phases: discharge/charge
and evaluate. During the discharge state in the PMOS inverter, the energy stored in the out
ox out node is recovered. At the beginning of this stage, PC is High and as it starts ramping
down, both outputs are pulled towards Vjp and the energy is recovered. This transition
is adiabatic until Vpc < Vrp —\Vjp\, which disables the cross-coupled PMOS structure.
Assuming that in is High and in is Low at the beginning of the Evaluate phase, Vpc starts
rising from Low to High and turns ON P3 and P4, which turns ON PI and P2. As long
as Vpc <

V rp

— \Vpp\, P3 and P4 are conducting. Since

V rp

> Vpc at this point, out starts

rising towards V r p through P4 and the two cross-coupled PMOSs help amplify the voltage
difference between out and out. Once the difference between the output nodes is larger
than \Vpp\, PI turns OFF and out charges adiabatically to Vdd- When Vpc >

V r p — \V tp \,
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P3 and P4 stop conducting and the outputs are disconnected from the input networks half
of the gate. This allows this family to be immune to any changes that occur in the inputs
after P3 and P4 have been turned off. Sampling of the outputs occurs at the end of the
Evaluate stage, when the PC is at its highest.

PC
PI

out

out
P4

RP
Fig. 6: TSEL PMOS buffer/inverter circuit.

II.2

Power Analysis Attacks Background

This section gives an introduction to power analysis attacks, explains how they are
implemented, and presents existing state of the art countermeasures.

Q.2.1

Power Analysis Attacks Basics

Cryptographic algorithms are designed to be secure from a mathematical standpoint,
but, as it is sometimes the case between theory and practice, many implementations of the
cryptographic algorithms may not be completely secure from attacks using other indirect
means. An attacker may obtain information from an encrypted communication channel by

25
means different than the ones originally intended for communication in that channel. This
kind of methods that exploit unintentional information channels are called side-channel
attacks. There exist several channels that have been used in the past to mount side-channel
attacks, e.g. electro-magnetic radiation [43, 51], time elapsed [84], leakage currents [61,
65], acoustic emanations [81], fault injection [79], and power usage. In this dissertation,
the focus is on the power analysis attacks and their countermeasures.
Power analysis attacks are a special subset of side-channel attacks that can be mounted
with relative ease and without requiring very expensive hardware. These attacks are aimed
at extracting secret information from a microprocessor or Application-Specific Integrated
Circuit (ASIC) chip by analyzing the power consumed by the chip during encryption or
decryption operations. It is likely that this kind of attacks will be more prevalent in the
future due to the recent boom in portable electronic devices. As more people integrate
these devices in their lives and store more and more of their personal information on
them, they become a worthy target to an attacker. Moreover, since a majority of the world
is moving towards implementing smart cards in the banking industry (credit and debit
cards), the issue of hardware security is of even more importance.
Most of the power analysis attacks are aimed at encryption cores or microprocessors
performing encryption operations. The extracted private keys could be used to mimic
a particular device and take advantage of it. There have been numerous attacks staged
on several kinds of encryption algorithms, including Data Encryption Standard (DES)
and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), by using power analysis attacks [40]—[42],
[44,47,72,75, 80, 82, 85]. As power analysis attacks are passive non-invasive attacks, it
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is usually very hard for the user to be aware of the attack and protect against it.
Power analysis attacks make use of the fact that a microprocessor uses asymmetric
amounts of power for different kinds of operations and instructions. A two-input CMOS
NAND gate is used as an example of information leakage as asymmetric power con
sumption, which can be used by attacker to gain insights into the inputs to the gate. The
transistor-level diagram of the NAND gate with charge (dotted line) and discharge (inter
rupted line) paths is given in Fig. 7. A truth table for the NAND gate is shown in Table 1.
It can be observed that for 3 input combinations (.AB = “00”, “01”, “10”) the gate output
is High, while for 1 input combination (AB = “11”) the value is Low. A table with all 16
possible transitions is presented in Table 2. When the inputs change between these two
different sets, the gate will consume dynamic energy (’D’ in Table 2), as the output value
switches. When the inputs switch between values inside each set, only static energy will
be consumed (’S’ in Table 2) by the CMOS gate. Since the amount of energy dissipated
between dynamic and static dissipations are very different, an imbalance can be observed
and unintentionally reveal information about the inputs to the gate.

Table 1: Truth table for a 2-input NAND gate.
Input
00
01
10
11

Output
1
1
1
0

Power analysis attacks are divided into two categories: Simple Power Analysis (SPA)
and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). SPA attacks were introduced by Kocher [40] and
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Fig. 7: A 2-input CMOS NAND gate showing charging (dotted) and discharging
(dot+line) paths.

rely on deriving the secret key directly from a given power trace. This can make SPA
attacks challenging in practice since an attacker might need detailed knowledge about
the architecture of the device under test and the particular cryptographic algorithm used.
Furthermore, if only one power trace is available, complex statistical methods are required
to extract the information from the signal. An example of a viable SPA attack is when a
person uses a smart card to pay for gas at a gas station. An attacker can compromise the
card reader in order to extract the power trace from a user’s card. It is not uncommon for a
user to frequent the same gas station more than once, so more traces could be obtained and
a SPA attack staged successfully. DPA attacks were also introduced in [40] and are the
most popular type of power analysis attacks since they do not require in-depth knowledge
of the attacked device and are effective at revealing secret keys even from very noisy power
traces. In contrast to SPA, DPA attacks need a large number of power traces, usually
requiring the possession of the cryptographic device for some time in order to mount
an attack on it. Several successful SPA and DPA attacks were implemented in recent
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Table 2: All 16 possible input transitions for a 2-input NAND gate and type of energy
consumption for each transition in a CMOS implementation.
Current
00
00
00
00
01
01
01
01
10
10
10
10
11
11
11
11

Next
00
01
10
11
00
01
10
11
00
01
10
11
00
01
10
11

E ty p e

s
s
s
D
S
s
s
D
S
S
S
D
D
D
D
S

years on specialized cryptographic cores [41], Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)
implementations [47, 63], and smart cards [40, 82], The relative ease of implementation
and possible consequences make power analysis attacks a growing concern for portable
electronic devices and call for power analysis attack resistant circuit design.

II.2.2

Existing Hardware Countermeasures

Power analysis attacks can be viewed as a problem from two different perspectives:
mathematical and engineering. As a mathematical problem, the goal is to find mathemati
cal models that describe the leakage of cryptographic devices in order to build secure sys
tems based on these models. As a result of this viewpoint, the solutions created are mainly
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software and algorithmic solutions, like masking. Masking solutions [48, 49, 50, 56] at
tempt to hide the bits processed in the cryptographic core by randomizing intermediate
results. These solutions, however, have been proven insecure several times in the past
[45,46] in order to hide the signal. As an engineering problem, the goal is to decrease the
leakage of information by decreasing the leaked signal or by increasing the noise. As a
result, the solutions from this perspective lead to the development of DPA-resistant logic
styles. This viewpoint has seen more research interest in the recent years as it tries to at
tack the problem at its root cause - at the hardware level, although more complex changes
need to be made to implement these solutions. In this work we focus on the engineering
approach and describe some of the proposed technologies to reduce information leakage
at the hardware level.
Most of the engineering approaches to the problem try to solve the problem of balanc
ing the amount of energy dissipated during switching between all possible inputs. Most of
the time, this is impossible to achieve perfectly, but the goal is to get as close as possible to
equal dissipation. In order to achieve balanced dissipation all input combinations have to
use the maximum amount of energy possible for a given gate. Several logic families and
other types of countermeasures have been introduced [37, 38, 52, 55, 57, 60, 64], [66][70], [73, 74, 76, 78, 83] and compared in [39, 53, 54, 59, 62, 71, 77]. However, almost
all these countermeasures use significantly more energy than an equivalent CMOS circuit
or are not designed to have built-in security against power analysis attacks. The two most
well-known countermeasures against power analysis attacks are Sense Amplifier Based
Logic [37] and Wave Dynamic Differential Logic [38] families and are discussed briefly
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in this work.
Sense Amplifier Based Logic (SABL) [37] is one of the first logic styles proposed as
a countermeasure against power analysis attacks. SABL cells are designed to have a con
stant internal power consumption independent of the processed logic values. Additionally,
combinational SABL cells are designed such that their time-of-evaluation (TOE) is data
independent, i.e. the cells only evaluate after all inputs have been set to complementary
values.
SABL cells are dual-rail and use precharge and evaluate stages to achieve balanced
energy dissipation. Unlike CMOS cells, all SABL cells are connected to a common
clock and are precharged simultaneously, which causes very high current peaks during
the precharge phase. The current peaks during the evaluation phase are smaller because
not all combinational SABL cells evaluate simultaneously. Since combinational SABL
cells only evaluate after all inputs have been set to complementary values, the evaluation
events of different types of cells are spread out over the evaluation phase. However, due
to a constant TOE, same type of gates evaluate at fixed moments in time for each clock
cycle and input combinations.
The area requirements for SABL circuits are at least doubled compared to equivalent
CMOS circuits, while the maximum clock frequency is halved. The power consumption
of SABL circuits is significantly larger than for CMOS circuit. Experimental results with a
2-input NAND gate showed an increase of around 10 x compared to an equivalent CMOS
gate, although this ratio is likely to fluctuate based on the type of gate tested. The DPA
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resistance of SABL circuits is typically very high (if all complementary wires are suffi
ciently balanced), because the internal power consumption of the SABL cells is constant
and the cells always evaluate at fixed moments of time during each clock cycle.
Figure 8 shows the transistor-level schematic of the 2-input NAND/AND SABL cell.
In order to achieve the same number of transitions at the cell outputs AND and NAND in
each clock cycle, the SABL cell consists of the differential pull-down network (DPDN)
and cross-coupled inverters, similar to a SRAM cell core. The DPDN is made of NMOS
transistors in such a way that the discharge paths use the same number of transistors,
regardless of the input combination. The inverters are cross-coupled so their outputs are
always complementary and this forms the sense amplifier part of the SABL gates. In a
SABL gate, the evaluation phase starts when the clock switches to a High value. During
this phase, the input signals of the DPDN are set to complementary values and the NMOS
transistor Pr3 is turned ON. As a result, the cell outputs AND and NAND are switched to
complementary values. When the clock switches to a Low value, the gate is in precharge
phase. During this phase, Pr\ and Pr2 charge all the internal nodes of the SABL gate to a
High value and the outputs of the gate to a Low value, thus SABL gates fall in the category
of “precharge to zero” gates. The precharge to zero is necessary to ensure the next level
of gates in the cascade do not provide a path to GND during the next evaluation phase. A
SABL cell can also be built from PMOS transistors in a differential pull-up network, but
a circuit has to contain only one type of cell in order to provide a valid computation.
The second most common type of logic style countermeasure against power analysis
attacks is Wave Dynamic Differential Logic (WDDL) [38], WDDL cells are built as
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Fig. 8: A 2-input SABL NAND gate.

dual-rail cells from single rail cells in standard-cell libraries. This makes the structure of
WDDL gates much simpler than SABL as this logic family was originally developed as
a secure computation method for FPGAs. A simpler design leads to significantly smaller
circuits than SABL, however this comes at the expense of lower DPA resistance. The
lower DPA resistance is mainly due to the combinational WDDL cells since their internal
power consumption and TOE are data dependent, which cause WDDL combinational cells
to suffer from early propagation.
Unlike SABL, only the sequential WDDL cells are connected to the clock signal,
so only these cells all precharge and evaluate simultaneously. Combinational WDDL
cells precharge when their inputs have been set to the precharge value and evaluate when
their inputs have been set to complementary values. Thus, the precharge value as well
as the complementary values provided by the sequential WDDL cells move like a wave
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through the combinational WDDL circuit. Since combinational WDDL cells precharge
and evaluate successively, the current peaks in WDDL circuits are much smaller than
those in SABL circuits but they contain higher variations. Even if the propagation delays
of complementary wires in balanced WDDL circuits are pairwise identical, the TOE of
the combinational WDDL cells is still dependent on the processed data, which reduces
the DPA resistance of WDDL circuits.
Area requirements for WDDL circuits are at least doubled compared to CMOS circuits
with equivalent functionality, similar to SABL circuits. Power consumption of WDDL
circuits also increases significantly compared to CMOS, but it is lower than SABL circuits
as it uses independent cells from standard libraries with smaller current peaks and does
not precharge simultaneously. Maximum clock rate in WDDL circuits is similar to CMOS
circuits, however, as the WDDL D-flip-flop consists of two stages of single-rail D-flipflops, it is necessary to double the clock frequency to achieve the same throughput as in
CMOS or SABL circuits.
The WDDL NAND/AND gate is presented in Fig. 9. It consists of a single-rail AND
cell with true inputs and a single-rail OR cell with complementary inputs. At the begin
ning of the evaluation phase, all complementary inputs of a combinational WDDL cell are
precharged to GND. When the input signals are set to complementary values, only one
GND to Vdd transition occurs at the outputs of the WDDL cell per evaluation cycle, while
the other output stays at GND. By ensuring one transition per evaluation cycle per gate,
WDDL is able to have a constant number of transitions for any given input combination
in a circuit, allowing it have some DPA resistance.
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Fig. 9: A 2-input WDDL NAND gate.

Energy consumption for WDDL cells is not constant mainly for three reasons. First,
different conducting paths with a varying number and arrangement of MOS transistors are
established for different input combinations. Second, not all internal nodes of a WDDL
cell are charged and discharged in the same way in each clock cycle for all data values,
leading to charges stored at internal nodes in a cell to be dependent on the value processed
(the memory effect). Third, the TOE of combinational WDDL cells depends on the input
values, as mentioned earlier.
Power analysis attacks are very powerful tools for an attacker to extract secret informa
tion from a device using relatively inexpensive equipment. The proposed countermeasures
found in the literature usually provide good protection against these attacks, but at a cost
of much larger area and energy consumption, making these solutions unsuitable for low
power applications. A new low-power solution for power analysis attacks is needed.
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CHAPTER IH
IDPAL - INPUT DECOUPLED PARTIALLY-ADIABATIC LOGIC
The main contribution of this work is the development of a new very low power
partially-adiabatic logic family with decoupled inputs named Input Decoupled PartiallyAdiabatic Logic (IDPAL). The originality of IDPAL is in its separation of a gate into two
distinct parts: input network evaluation and function evaluation. In this chapter, IDPAL
and several of its applications, starting from small logic gates to very large arithmetic cir
cuits, are presented. Experimental results show that IDPAL is capable of reducing energy
consumption of circuits by up to 79% compared to its equivalent CMOS implementations
[1, 2, 3]. IDPAL also uses at least 25% less energy than state-of-the-art adiabatic logic
families. Several large circuits are described and their energy consumption compared to
other equivalent CMOS and adiabatic implementations.

III.1

IDPAL Operating Principle

IDPAL is a new very low power partially-adiabatic logic family. Similar to other
adiabatic logic families, IDPAL is a dual-rail family, so it requires both an input and its
complement in order to evaluate a given function. IDPAL differs from other families in
the fact that gates implemented in IDPAL are composed of two decoupled parts: input
network evaluation and function evaluation. A general view of an IDPAL gate is shown
in Fig. 10. The inputs control two complementary switching networks to evaluate the
true (F) and complementary (F) functions. Once the inputs are evaluated, one switching
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network is conductive, allowing current to flow from the PC to the respective NMOS
transistor of the function evaluation part. The complementary switching network is OFF
and its respective NMOS transistor remains OFF. In this way, the inputs are provided to
the function evaluation part where the appropriate output manifests as a High by following
the PC and the complementary output remains at Low. The two NMOS and two PMOS
transistors form the function evaluation part of IDPAL gates. A unique feature of IDPAL
is the connection of input networks to the PC rather than GND, unlike other adiabatic
technologies, which allows the inputs evaluation portion to be actively driven by the PC.
A more detailed explanation of IDPAL gate operation is described using the example of a
buffer/inverter.

PC

out

out

Fig. 10: General gate construction in IDPAL.

The simplest functional IDPAL gate is the buffer/inverter shown in Fig. 11 and its op
eration is as follows. Assuming that in is at Vdd and in is at GND, when the PC rises from
GND to Vdd, in will cause N1 to turn ON. When Vpc reaches Vjn (the NMOS threshold
voltage), N3 will turn ON and out will be anchored at GND. This event will turn P2 ON
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and allow out to charge adiabatically to Vdd and the circuit will achieve the buffer/inverter
function with complementary outputs. When the PC swings from Vdd to GND, the en
ergy stored in out will be recovered through P2 until Vpc < Vjp■ The remaining energy
is discarded to GND if the inputs change, resulting in non-adiabatic losses. Otherwise,
the output ramps up again as the PC rises, without any non-adiabatic losses. The energy
loss due to the threshold voltage of the PMOS transistors is unavoidable in any partiallyadiabatic family that uses the cross-coupled PMOS structure.

PC

Ml P l j l

out

out

Fig. 11: IDPAL buffer/inverter.

An equivalent RC circuit for an IDPAL buffer/inverter with the main capacitances is
shown in Fig. 12. Each transistor was replaced with a resistor to account for energy loss
when the transistor is ON and 3 capacitors to account for the three main capacitances of
a transistor (gate-to-drain/source, drain-to-substrate, and source-to-substrate). Assuming
that the input in is High and its complement, in, is Low, we obtain the circuit shown in
Fig. 13. From this circuit, we observe three separate circuits that are part of an IDPAL

gate: input evaluation circuit, complement evaluation circuit, and function evaluation cir
cuit. The input gate capacitance is not connected to the input evaluation circuit, instead
it is connected as an additional capacitor to the function evaluation circuit in order to
account for the capacitance of the subsequent gates driven by the current gate.

PC

in
out

out

Fig. 12: Equivalent RC circuit for an IDPAL buffer/inverter.

A more complete picture can be observed by examining the RC representation of
an IDPAL 2-input AND/NAND gate implementation using the three different circuits,
shown in Fig. 14. In this example, the input network is composed of two series conduct
ing transistors, whereas the other two circuits (complement output evaluation and output
evaluation, respectively) are the same for all gates and circuits. If a larger gate is used in a
circuit, the additional losses will take place in the input evaluation network due to the ad
ditional RC nodes. However, due to being driven by the PC, any additional capacitors that
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PC
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ou t

Fig. 13: Equivalent RC circuit for an IDPAL buffer/inverter with one of the inputs con
ducting.

are charged will be discharged to the PC as the charge is recycled, therefore contributing
to the energy-efficiency of the circuit.
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Fig. 14: Equivalent RC circuit breakdown for an IDPAL 2-input AND/NAND gate.

In order to calculate the energy usage in an IDPAL gate, each of the three circuits has
to be investigated separately by calculating an expression for the current trace. This value
can then be multiplied with the PC voltage and integrated over time in order to calculate
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the energy dissipation for a given circuit. For the first sub-circuit, the complex impedance
can be evaluated by:
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The current is then calculated as:

(10)

i(t)= m = Y f sin(w).

The second sub-circuit has a very low voltage swing, only up to the threshold volt
age of the PMOS transistor and is controlled only by the
calculated by:

V dd-

The impedance can be
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The third sub-circuit contains two types of power sources: the sinusoidal PC and
the Vdd, therefore energy dissipation from both sources has to be taken into account.
From a personal interview with Ana Samolov (Ph.D. Physics), the solution to this problem
appears to be non-trivial.
Simulation waveforms for a single buffer/inverter are shown in Fig. 15. The simulation
was performed using LTspice in a TSMC 0.25/im process with transistor width/length
(W/L) ratios of 0.36/zm/0.24//m and 0.72/im/0.24//m for the NMOS and PMOS transistors,
respectively. The clock frequency is 10 MHz and the input frequency is 5 MHz. From the
Figure, it can be clearly seen that when an input is High for two consecutive clock cycles,
the output is not taken to GND after the first clock cycle, but stays at the \Vpp\ level until
the PC ramps up again. The output is taken to GND level and the energy below Vpp is lost
only when the inputs change values. This allows the non-adiabatic energy losses to have a
small contribution to the total energy consumption if the inputs are constant for very long
periods.
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Fig. 15: Simulation waveform for an IDPAL buffer/inverter.
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Energy dissipation is calculated by integrating the instantaneous power over the op
erating time, as was done for several previous adiabatic technologies, including [8], [10],
and [11], using

JQ
T

^dissipated ==

T

i(t)V(t)dt.

(13)

A plot of the energy dissipation and recovery for the single buffer/inverter setup above
is shown in Fig. 16. As mentioned earlier, when the input is High for two clock cycles,
the energy stored in the gate output capacitance when the PC reaches Vpc = \Vt p \ is not
lost, but recycled into the next evaluation cycle. The Figure also shows that the amount of
energy lost is larger when the inputs switch values and the outputs are re-evaluated since
the complementary output needs to be charged to Vdd from the GND level.
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Fig. 16: Energy consumption plot for a single IDPAL buffer/inverter with alternating
inputs.
Circuits with multiple layers of logic need to be controlled using alternate clock phases
(PC and PC), similar to other adiabatic families. To test the energy efficiency of ID
PAL using multiple small gates, a simulation was performed using 5 buffers and results

44
are shown in Fig. 17. The simulation was performed using the same parameters as in
the case of the single buffer/inverter. The value of the input is cascaded through each
buffer/inverter and reaches the output of the fifth buffer/inverter by the third clock cycle
of the first PC. It can be observed that when the output is applied at t = 0.75ps, it takes
50fjs for it to evaluate to peak in each buffer, with the final output available at t = 3.25jus.
Layout of adiabatic circuits is very different compared to standard CMOS circuits
because special care has to be taken to minimize the area taken by the PC’s and the larger
number of transistors, so a custom cell library must be created. The layouts of the 2-input
AND/NAND in IDPAL and 2N2P and NAND gate in CMOS in a 3 metal, 2 poly process
are shown in Fig. 18. When compared with its CMOS equivalent, the IDPAL AND/NAND
is 2.4 x larger, however, this is mostly due to IDPAL being a dual-rail logic family as it
produces both an output and its complement. Additionally, the CMOS NAND gate does
not contain any connections to a clock, although layout of larger circuits will need to
add the clock and other control circuitry. When compared to the smallest layout from an
adiabatic implementation (2N2P AND/NAND), the IDPAL AND/NAND uses only 20%
more area, but has the added advantage of being able to use a two-phase sinusoidal PC
instead of a four-phase trapezoidal PC. The type of PC used and its generation can greatly
impact both the area used by a circuit (due to routing constraints) and the power used, as
some types of PC are more efficient than others. In this case, IDPAL has an advantage
over 2N2P as a sinusoidal PC can be more efficiently generated than a trapezoidal one.
While adiabatic circuits use more circuit area (at most 2.16x in the case of the IDPAL
NAND gate), their energy efficiency (5x less energy) can justify their use in low-power
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(a) IDPAL AND/NAND

(b) 2N2P AND/NAND

(c) CMOS NAND

Fig. 18: Layout of IDPAL and 2N2P AND/NAND and CMOS NAND gates in a 3-metal,
2-poly process.

applications. Additionally, more complex gates would reduce the relative increase in area,
making IDPAL even more attractive as a new low-power family.
Larger gates and circuits using IDPAL can be built by replacing the two input evalu
ation blocks (F and F in Fig. 10) with NMOS pull-up switching networks and comple
ment, respectively. Being an adiabatic logic family, IDPAL has all the features of other
adiabatic logic families, including micro-pipelining and the need for extra buffers in the
output chain in order to propagate a valid value to the output. Additionally, similar to
other two-phase sinusoidal logic families, IDPAL offers an easier solution to manage the
PC’s during layout, both in circuit area used and in routing issues, when compared to
adiabatic solutions using more clock phases. As an example, in a two-phase sinusoidal
family, a possible solution for routing the PC’s would be to have tracks for one on one
side of the circuit and the other on the other side. A four-phase trapezoidal family would
need to use two separate metal layers for layout to avoid overlap, which results in a less
energy-efficient design.
Simulations of several other basic gates were performed using LTspice in a 0.25/mi
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process with a two-phase sinusoidal PC oscillating between OV and 1.8V to measure the
energy consumption of each gate. The W/L ratios are 0.36jum/0.24//m and 0.72//m/0.24//m
for the NMOS and PMOS transistors, respectively. Energy consumption values per cycle
for single gates running at 100 MHz with a given load capacitance are shown in Table 3.
Simulation values agree with expected values for these basic gates. It was expected that
the AND and OR gates would have very similar values for energy consumption due to
their complementary implementations at the transistor level, a fact that was confirmed in
simulations. It was also expected that the inverter would have the lowest energy usage
since it is the simplest of all structures, whereas the XOR gate would have the highest
energy usage due to a larger input stack and thus a larger resistance and capacitance. All
gates were simulated in their usual implementations without any modifications.

Table 3: Energy dissipation (J ) per cycle for each type of gate and load at 100 MHz.
Gate/Load
Inverter
AND
OR
XOR

IfF
2.25E-17
2.38E-17
2.37E-17
2.51E-17

lOfF
8.46E-17
8.61E-17
8.59E-17
8.68E-17

lOOfF
7.56E-16
8.14E-16
8.22E-16
8.35E-16

In order to confirm the energy efficiency of the proposed logic with composite gates, a
full-adder (FA), shown in Fig. 19, with a lOfF output load was simulated and compared to
its equivalent implementations in CMOS, CAL, 2N2P, and 2N-2N2P. Several frequencies
were tested in order to observe the advantage of the proposed family over other adiabatic
families and CMOS equivalents in a wide operating range. A more compact design was
selected with the Sum and Cout being calculated in one stage instead of three stages and
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several gates that would be otherwise needed for a traditional implementation. The FA
in the current implementation uses 38 transistors, while the CAL, 2N2P, and CMOS fulladders use 42,34, and 28 transistors, respectively. An even more compact implementation
is possible for the Sum term in IDPAL by combining the inputs forming a 2-input XOR
gate and reducing the total number of transistors required for the full-adder to 30, making
the difference between the IDPAL and CMOS implementations even smaller.

PC

Sum

Sum
PC

Cout

C out

Fig. 19: IDPAL full-adder implementation.

Simulation waveforms for the FA implementation in IDPAL are shown in Fig. 20. All
8 possible input combinations, ranging from “ 111” down to “000” are covered to confirm
correct operation. Similar to the case of the buffer/inverter, when the evaluation of inputs
does not change the output from one clock to the next, the value of the output does not
fall to GND level but stays at \Vjp\, contributing to the energy efficiency of the circuit.
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Fig. 20: IDPAL full-adder simulation waveforms. Inputs cycle from “ 111” down to “000”.

Full-adder simulations were also implemented for other adiabatic families and the
results agree with the results reported in [8] and [10], allowing us to conclude that our
models and implementations function correctly. As it can be observed from Fig. 21, the
FA implemented using IDPAL is up to 67% more energy-efficient than other adiabatic fulladders (CAL FA at 100 MHz) and 79% more energy-efficient than CMOS (at 10 MHz).
These results are in agreement with previous small-scale tests performed on simple gates.
Although the IDPAL full-adder uses more transistors than a CMOS FA (38 vs. 28 in
CMOS), it uses less energy due to a more energy-efficient operation.

m.2

Results for Large Arithmetic Circuits

Building circuits larger than a few gates in IDPAL is accomplished in a straightfor
ward manner. While the design is relatively simple, care has to be taken in the choice of
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Fig. 21: Energy usage (J)/cycle for a full-adder with lOfF load at different frequencies.

implementation. Similar to other adiabatic logic families, IDPAL needs to use buffers to
maintain the validity of a given signal as it moves through the micro-pipeline due to its
continuously-oscillating nature. If this issue is overlooked, the resulting circuit will pro
duce garbage outputs. Depending on the chosen implementation, buffers can contribute a
significant number of additional transistors to an adiabatic circuit, so choosing the most
compact implementation in terms of number of evaluation stages and number of buffers
is very important.
In this experiment, a Kogge-Stone Adder (KSA) of several sizes (8-, 16-, and 32-bit)
has been simulated at different frequencies with lOfF output loads to confirm the energy
efficiency of IDPAL for very large circuits. KSA is a type of Carry-Lookahead Adder
(CLA) proposed in [31] which produces results in 0(log2n) time, resulting in 5, 6, and
7 micro-pipeline stages for each adder size, respectively. This adder takes more area to
implement than other fast adders due to a larger number of gates used, but has a constant
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fan-out of 2 at each stage, which increases performance. KSA is the industry standard for
adder implementation and is considered the fastest adder design available.
The diagram of the 32-bit KSA is shown in Fig. 22 for reference. KSA uses a struc
ture similar to a CLA with Propagate and Generate blocks, but restructures them into
two new blocks, called Black Cell and Grey Cell. A Grey cell acts as a traditional CLA
Carry-generation unit, whereas the Black cell includes the functionality of a Grey cell and
adds the Propagate functionality from the CLA. Several KSAs were simulated and the
total number of each type of gate and transistors used in each IDPAL implementation is
given in Table 4. These numbers show that with each increase in the length of the adder,
the main contributions in the increase of the transistor count come from non-linear vari
ations in the numbers of Black Cells and Buffers. The KSAs were compared to similar
implementations in CAL, 2N-2N2P, and CMOS. Even when using the most compact im
plementation of a fast adder, the number of transistors contributed by the buffers needed
for an adiabatic implementation is around 25-26%, stressing the importance of choosing
an appropriate design in implementation. The buffers in the diagram are only needed for
the adiabatic implementations and are removed for the CMOS implementation. Micro
pipelining in adiabatic circuits also allows for the first rounds of outputs of the 32-bit
KSA to be available only after 7 PC phase delays, however, if the pipeline does not have
any stalls, the outputs are available one per PC cycle afterwards.
The 32-bit KSAs were simulated in LTspice using a TSMC 0.25/nn process with a
W/L ratio of 0.72jum/0.24/mi and 0.36/jm/0.24/im for p- and n-type transistors, respec
tively, with PC's oscillating between GND and 1.8 V. Several frequencies were tested
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Table 4: Number of each type of gate and total transistor count for the 8-, 16-, and 32-bit
KSAs implemented in IDPAL.
8-bit
16-bit
32-bit

AND
8
16
32

XOR
16
32
64

Grey
8
16
32

Black
13
38
103

Buffer
32
80
192

Transistors
762
1836
4350

in order to observe the energy advantages of the proposed family over other adiabatic
families and CMOS equivalents and simulation results are plotted in Fig 23. As can be
observed from the plot, IDPAL maintains its energy efficiency against other implementa
tions for all frequencies tested. The proposed family uses at least 22% less energy than
2N-2N2P at 10MHz and 71% less energy than CMOS at 100 MHz. Energy consumption
values for all simulations are given in Table 5.
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Fig. 23: Energy usage (J)/operation for a 32-bit KSA with a lOfF load at different fre
quencies.
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The use of adiabatic logic increases the complexity of the circuit and the number of
transistors used (Table 5), but the energy savings can justify this increase. The largest
increase in the number of transistors between CMOS and other adiabatic implementations
is due to the high number of buffers used to buffer the signal from stage to stage (around
26% of the total number of transistors). The largest number of transistors used were in
the CAL implementation due to the use of two control transistors per gate in order to
achieve single-phase operation. The 2N-2N2P and IDPAL implementations had the same
number of transistors, however, the proposed implementation has a 22-26% better energy
efficiency at the frequencies tested.

Table 5: Energy dissipation per addition operation at different frequencies and number of
transistors needed for each implementation of the 32-bit KSA.
Family
IDPAL
CMOS
CAL
2N-2N2P
2N-2P

1MHz
6.98E-13
3.30E-12
1.24E-12
9.42E-13
1.07E-12

Energy/op (J)
10MHz
100MHz
7.12E-13 9.49E-13
3.31E-12 3.32E-I2
1.60E-12 2.38E-12
9.15E-13 1.24E-12
1.23E-12 1.42E-12

Number of
transistors
4350
2528
5402
4350
3298

An experiment was performed with the 4 adiabatic families investigated in this disser
tation (CAL, 2N2P, 2N-2N2P, and IDPAL) with a 32-bit KSA running at 1GHz in order
to observe the energy efficiency of each implementation and compare it with a CMOS im
plementation. Adiabatic circuits have an advantage over an equivalent CMOS implemen
tation at lower operating frequencies due to longer charging times, allowing for smaller
resistive losses in the transistor networks and, thus, increased energy efficiency. As the
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frequency of a circuit is increased, the charging time is decreased proportionately. There
fore, it is expected that the energy efficiency of adiabatic circuits at speeds of 1GHz will
be reduced compared to lower speeds, generally surpassing the energy consumption of the
CMOS equivalent due to the larger number of switching transistors.
Experimental results (Fig. 24) show that the energy usage in all adiabatic circuits
grows dramatically when running at 1GHz, as expected. The amount of energy usage
between the adiabatic families are in the same order as running at other frequencies. It
can be observed from the Figure that a CAL implementation has a 5 x larger energy usage
than CMOS, whereas the IDPAL implementation uses around 2.75 x more than a CMOS
implementation. Again, the much larger energy usage in adiabatic circuits at this fre
quency is due to the shorter charging time compared to other frequencies and the larger
number of switching transistors compared to a CMOS implementations. These results
are similar to previously-reported results for circuits runing at frequencies higher than
100MHz.
Another experiment was performed only with the two most energy-efficient logic fam
ilies (2N2P and IDPAL) in order to observe the approximate frequency at which the adi
abatic implementations equal the energy consumption of a CMOS implementation. A
32-bit KSA was simulated at 200MHz and it was found that the 2N2P implementation
uses 2.65£-12 J/operation whereas the IDPAL implementation was around 18% lower
at 2.18£-12 J. Both values are very close to the CMOS energy dissipation for the same
circuit at 3.3E ~ n J. Based on previous energy usage values from 100MHz and 1GHz,
it is estimated that both 2N2P and IDPAL would cross the energy threshold of a CMOS

56

0

1a*

Q
O.
>
S?
aC*

CMOS
CAL
2N2P
2N-2N2P
6.0OE-12

IDPAL

UJ

2 .00 m :

F requency (MHz)

Fig. 24: Energy usage for a 32-bit KSA at frequencies from 1MHz to 1GHz.

implementation at a frequency slightly lower than 250MHz.
Lastly, an even larger design was simulated in order to observe the energy efficiency
of IDPAL - 8-, 16-, and 32-bit Wallace multipliers [32]. A Wallace multiplier design was
chosen because it has one of the lowest number of evaluation stages compared with other
hardware multipliers, which implies that the result is available in fewer clock cycles in an
adiabatic implementation and fewer buffers will be used in its implementation.
The operation of a Wallace multiplier is as follows. First, the partial products are
calculated using 2-input AND gates for each pairwise bit combination of inputs. Next, a
series of full adders are used to compress three rows of intermediary results of the same
weight into two rows by using the following rule. If there are three rows of intermediary
results available, then full adders are used on each three results, which will generate a bit
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of the current weight and a bit of the next higher weight. Next, if there are two inputs of the
same weight, they are input into a half adder. Lastly, any remaining intermediary results
are buffered to the next layer. If three rows of intermediary results are not available, the
existing intermediary results are not grouped in any half-adders but buffered to the next
stage. Once the number of partial product layers reaches two, an adder is used to add
them and get a final result. In this implementation, a KSA was used as the last stage for
faster results. Larger multipliers follow the same idea, but include a much larger number
of compression stages and transistors in their implementations.
Simulation results from the 32-bit Wallace multiplier using a 0.25//m process with
W/L ratio of 0.72/rm/0.24/jm and 0.36//m/0.24/im for PMOS and NMOS transistors, re
spectively, with PC’s oscillating between GND and 1.8 V at several frequencies are shown
in Figure 25. These results show that IDPAL maintains its advantage in energy efficiency
even for very large circuits and would be a suitable candidate for a low-power circuit im
plementation. Another observation made during the building of these multipliers was that
the number of buffers used at each multiplier size decreased as a percentage of the total
as the size of the multiplier increased. For the 8-bit multiplier, the number of transistors
used in buffers account for 13.1%, whereas for the 32-bit multiplier it was only 5.1% of
the total transistor count. This is a clear example of the influence of choosing a suitable
design on the number of transistors used for an adiabatic implementation and its energy
efficiency.
In order to test IDPAL energy efficiency with process scaling, the 32-bit KSA was
also implemented in a TSMC 0.18/mn process with W/L ratios of 0.54//m/0.18//m and
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Fig. 25: Energy usage (J)/operation for a 32-bit Wallace multiplier with a lOfF load at
different frequencies.

0.27jum/0.18jum. Results from these simulations with lOfF loads and PC oscillating be
tween GND and 1.8V are shown in Fig. 26. Dennard’s Law [29] indicates that a change
in the feature size causes a decrease in the dissipated energy proportional to

1 /k ,

where

k is the ratio of the original to the new feature sizes, if all other values remain constant
(e.g. operating voltage). When scaling from a 0.25/jm process to a 0.18/im process, we
have

k

= 0.25/0.18 = 1.388, making the energy dissipation for the new process approx

imately 0.72 x the old value, although in most cases in literature this is rounded to 0.7.
Simulation results from the 0.18jum implementation of the 32-bit KSA show that the new
energy dissipation values are within the range 0.69 to 0.74 of the results for the 0.25/an
implementation. Variations are likely due to the rounding of values in calculating the
energy dissipation, but are within previously reported limits on scaled circuits, including
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adiabatic circuits [18]. The result agree with expected values since the two adjacent pro
cesses are both far from the current deep-sub-micron processes and leakage current and
leakage energy do not have a large contribution to the overall energy dissipation. At these
processes, a reduction in feature size implies a proportionate reduction in the area and
capacitance of a circuit and a similar loss mechanism. Even a deep-sub-micron processes,
where leakage currents are much larger, the reported energy scaling closely approximates
Dennard’s Law for frequencies between 1 MHz and 100 MHz [18].
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Fig. 26: Energy usage/operation for a 32-bit KSA with a lOfF load at different frequencies
in a TSMC 180nm process.

Process scaling also enables circuit operation using a smaller operating voltage. One
of the main drivers of lower energy dissipation has been the quadratic dependence of en
ergy loss with operating voltage (E = 0.5CV2). However, CMOS circuits are limited in
the amount the operating voltage can be reduced since a lower operating voltage increases
the gate propagation delay, resulting in a slower circuit. CMOS circuits are limited by
design since their propagation delay depends on the critical path. Adiabatic logic is not
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limited in its voltage reduction by any timing constraints since each gate operates inde
pendently and the propagation delay is negligible. The limiting factor for the operating
voltage reduction in IDPAL are the 2 NMOS transistors in the function evaluation part of
a gate, as they need to be conducting in order for the gate to be able to generate the proper
outputs. More formally, VoD,min@IDPAL = Vj n - If the operating voltage falls below this
value, the circuit will malfunction and produce invalid outputs. Other adiabatic families
have similar operating voltage constraints, with the operating voltage minimums ranging
between max{VTN,\VTp\) (for 2N2P) and 2VTN (for PFAL) [18].

IIL3

Chapter Conclusion

This chapter presented IDPAL - a new partially-adiabatic logic family capable of
achieving up to 79% reduction in energy compared to equivalent CMOS circuits and at
least 25% less energy than state-of-the-art adiabatic families. Simulation examples rang
ing from small gates (buffer/inverter, AND, OR, XOR) to very large complex circuits
(adder, multiplier) were presented. Results revealed a consistent reduction in energy dis
sipation across circuits of all sizes, making EDPAL a promising alternative to CMOS in
low power circuits. An experiment using a 32-bit KSA showed that energy consumption
in IDPAL circuits scales well with feature size reduction, although more experiments are
required for the deep-sub-micron feature sizes. It was also shown that EDPAL, like other
adiabatic logic families, does not have as strict of a limitation on the scaling of operating
voltage due to its micro-pipelining.
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CHAPTER IV
POWER ANALYSIS ATTACK SECURITY USING IDPAL
In this chapter, the resistance of power analysis attacks of IDPAL as applied to low
power circuits is explored. IDPAL has very good energy consumption characteristics,
as shown in Chapter HI, but another feature of interest is the almost-constant energy
dissipation, regardless of the input combinations [4]. This makes IDPAL a promising
countermeasure for power analysis attacks in low power circuits. This chapter explores
the security aspect of IDPAL against power analysis attacks using several security met
rics and power models. It also compares its security against state-of-the-art secure logic
families and other partially-adiabatic logic families.

IV.l

Motivation for Combinational Circuit Security

As power analysis attacks are based on correlations or energy differences between
intermediate values, many power analysis attacks are focused in places where these values
are stored - registers. This is a great opportunity for an attacker because register activity
is clocked and reproducible in time, which means that register statistics will have a strong
correlation with either the contents of a register or changes in its contents.
In this work, the focus is on the hardware security of combinational logic, including
large arithmetic circuits, in contrast with some of the previous approaches. This work was
motivated by the fact that a majority of the transistors in most circuits are used for com
binational logic rather than sequential logic. For example, the AES encryption algorithm
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uses around 80% combinational logic by area and power dissipation [77], with the rest
being sequential logic and interconnects. However, the combinational part of the circuit
is not the most frequent the target for power analysis attacks. One of the reasons for not
attacking combinational circuits is the increased difficulty of the attack because the com
binational gates evaluate at data-dependent times and might also include logic hazards,
whose power dissipation is difficult to model.
In a system where all registers are protected against power analysis attacks, which can
become a reality given all previous attempts at secure logic implementations, the only
source of possible information leakage resulting from different inputs to combinational
circuit. Given the nature of CMOS circuits, one may observe that in a given circuit, the
registers can consume power on the rising edge and/or falling edge of the clock, whereas
combinational logic consumes power shortly after the registers have evaluated. With this
knowledge in mind, it would not be difficult to balance the energy consumption of reg
isters as their number is relatively small compared to the combinational circuits. Both
SPA and DPA could target combinational logic circuits if the registers are protected. In
this chapter, we assume that required protections are in place for the easy targets (regis
ters) and focus on the secure implementations of combinational circuits in order to thwart
power analysis attacks in the future.
Since the other theme of this work is providing a solution for low power environ
ments, secure logic applications studied have to also fulfill the low power requirement.
Many previously-proposed technologies often use significantly more energy than a regu
lar CMOS circuit, making them unsuitable for our applications. Some of these solutions
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are compared with IDPAL and other adiabatic families in the next sections.

IV.2 Security Metrics and Power Models Used

Resistance against power analysis attacks can be measured theoretically using sev
eral methods. In a low power secure design environment, the first criteria is low power
consumption. The average energy (E) usage per operation is measured as the parameter
indicative of low power performance. Along with the average energy consumption, the
minimum (£mw) and maximum (fw x) energy usage for different input combinations is
also tracked to give a better idea of the energy imbalance between the best and worst case
scenarios for a given circuit. These values are used in a second parameter called Normal
Energy Deviation (NED), calculated as (fw * —Emin) I E-max- A third parameter used for
resistance against power analysis attacks is the Normalized Standard Deviation (NSD),
calculated as Oe /E , where o>£ is the dissipated energy standard deviation. The fourth
parameter used in this work is the current trace of a circuit (either iydd or ipc) which is di
rectly proportional to the power consumption and could leak information about individual
bits processed if enough traces are available for analysis.
A power model for the variability of power consumption for a circuit has to be care
fully chosen in order to be able to successfully perform power analysis attacks on the
given circuit. There are several methods for constructing a power model, one of which
is simulation of the device under attack. This can be especially useful if the architecture
is known in advance and simulation results can provide a more accurate prediction of the
power consumption of the device. However, in most cases the architecture of a circuit is
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not known in advance or it is infeasible to simulate it, so a more general model should be
used. Two of the most common leakage models are the Hamming weight and Hamming
distance models [82].
The Hamming Weight model is the most basic power consumption model and has
been used in SPA and DPA attacks extensively in the past [40]. This model can be applied
to approximate the power consumption of data buses and relies on the fact that a bus will
consume an amount of power proportional to the number of bits switched ON on the bus.
It assumes that a bus with no bits ON will consume an insignificant amount of power
compared to when all bits are ON. This model can be used when no information about
a particular implementation exists, but it is not very effective at showing accurate values
for the power consumption of a circuit. This model is also more effective on pre-charged
buses where the pre-charged value is “all zeroes”, which yields the power consumption
model to depend on W//(0...0 © Yj)

=

Wn(Yj),

where T, is the value of an intermediate

variable at time i [82].
The second most common power model is the Hamming Distance model - an exten
sion of the Hamming Weight model. This model uses the changes in value at a given
time to determine the power usage. Changes in value can occur in both combinational
and sequential circuits and the power model uses the idea that the approximate amount of
power consumption is proportional to the number of ‘O’ —>‘1’ and ‘1’ —» ‘0’ transitions in
the circuit. The number of bit transitions can be calculated using the Hamming weight of
the XOR of the two different output values. More formally, Du(Yi-\,Yi) = Wh (Y ^\ ©1/),
where i is the time at which the switch from one value to the other occurs. This model
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gives a better approximation for the power consumption than the Hamming Weight model,
but it requires a more in-depth knowledge of the device under attack.

IV.3 Experimental Results

A simple experiment to demonstrate the energy usage differences and the information
that can be gathered from circuits when using CMOS gates starts the procedure. In this
example, an inverter is implemented in CMOS with a lOfF load at 10 MHz and a periodic
input with 25% duty cycle. The current trace is shown in Fig. 27. Note that the current
amplitudes are shown as negative when the outputs are charging and positive when the
outputs are discharging. It is relatively easy to notice the input transitions based on the
inverter current trace and guess the type of gate used. It can be observed that the input
is periodic with a 400ns period, discharging the output at t = 475ns and charging 100ns
later and keeping the output constant for 300 ns. If it is known that the gate is a function
of one input, then it can be guessed that it most likely is an inverter. Larger gates can be
analyzed in a similar manner, but require more sophisticated analysis and statistics. This
small experiment shows a definite need for countermeasures in combinational circuits and
the unsuitability of CMOS circuits to act as secure hardware circuits.
Another experiment was performed using 2-input NAND gates implemented in SABL,
WDDL, 2N2P, CAL, and IDPAL. The gates were simulated in LTspice with a lOfF output
load using a 0.25/jm process with a W/L ratio of 0.72//m/0.24^m and 0.36jum/0.24//m
for p- and n-type transistors, respectively. The experiment was performed at 100MHz
using a square-wave clock for SABL and WDDL, trapezoidal PC for CAL and 2N2P, and
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Fig. 27: Current trace for a CMOS inverter.

sinusoidal PC for EDPAL, oscillating between GND and 1.8 V.
The current drawn from the source (or PC, in case of the adiabatic circuits) was taken
as the first security metric. Current traces from each of the simulated NAND gates cycling
through the basic 4 possible inputs (“ 11” -> “10” -» “01” —> “00”) are shown in Figures
28-32. The input sequence starts at time t = 40 ns and repeats every 40 ns. Note that
the current traces in the following Figures have a negative amplitude for current supplied
from the power source and a positive amplitude for the current returned to the source (only
applies to adiabatic circuits). The short positive peaks for SABL and WDDL are due to
input switching activity and are not considered as energy recovery but discharging of the
output capacitors.
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Fig. 28: Current trace for a 2-input SABL AND/NAND gate.

Fig. 29: Current trace for a 2-input WDDL AND/NAND gate.
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Fig. 30: Current trace for a 2-input CAL AND/NAND gate.
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Fig. 31: Current trace for a 2-input 2N2P AND/NAND gate.
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Fig. 32: Current trace for a 2-input IDPAL AND/NAND gate.

Figure 33 presents current traces from all implementations on the same scale to pro
vide a better view of the magnitudes for each family. It clearly shows very large spikes
and magnitude differences in current traces for the SABL and WDDL implementations
and much smaller peaks and variations in the adiabatic implementations. This makes adi
abatic implementations a promising solution in reducing both the energy consumption and
improving hardware security against power analysis attacks.
Differences in the current drawn from the source can be used in SPA and DPA attacks
to observe the power dissipation and extract information about a circuit. In CAL and
2N2P, the current spikes are larger than IDPAL due to using a trapezoidal PC instead
of a sinusoidal PC. The sinusoidal PC allows for a longer charging time, leading to
smoother current variations and more uniform energy dissipation. When compared to
the two non-adiabatic solutions, the largest difference between current peaks is larger
in IDPAL compared with the best previous implementation (15/iA vs. 6/rA in SABL).
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However, the largest peak current in the current implementation is almost 4 x less than in
SABL. The significantly lower peak current is an advantage of IDPAL and could further
contribute to the security of information in a given circuit, especially if the attacker does
not possess tools capable of measuring at this resolution. Additionally, the basic twoinput AND/NAND gate uses 12 transistors in SABL, 10 transistors in WDDL, and only 8
transistors in IDPAL. Thus IDPAL offers a method to design secure circuits while using a
lower number of transistor, which implies less area and, consequently, significantly lower
energy dissipation than both WDDL and SABL.
The figures of merit described earlier (NED and NSD) along with the average energy
usage measure are given in Table 6. Simulation results show that information leakage in
the NAND gates is very low for the SABL family (NSD=2.71%), however, this comes
at a very large energy consumption as the gate draws the maximum amount of energy
in the pre-charge phase for every input (£=382fJ), over 34 x the energy used in the ID
PAL NAND gate. WDDL yielded much better results in terms of energy consumption
(only approximately 5 x the energy for IDPAL), but the differences in the amount of en
ergy used are more significant than SABL gates (NSD = 90.08%). Both CAL and 2N2P
offered much lower energy consumption compared with SABL and WDDL, mainly due
to being adiabatic implementations, and leaked similar amounts of information between
themselves. IDPAL has better energy characteristics than both CAL and 2N2P and leaks a
slightly smaller amount of information (NSD = 40.7%). It can be observed that the NED
and NSD for SABL are much lower than any other approaches. This is mainly because
these are normalized values and SABL has a very large energy consumption. Nominal
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Fig. 33: Current traces for all AND/NAND gates in the experiment.
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value for the energy differences for SABL is approximately equal to the deviation of
2N2P and CAL and roughly 3 x larger than IDPAL. In conclusion, SABL has very good
information leakage characteristics compared to IDPAL, but it comes at a much larger
increase in average energy consumption, making it unfit for low-power applications.

Table 6: Security metrics for the NAND/AND gate for each logic family.

EmaxLfJ]
NED[%]
E im
oEm
NSD[%]

SABL
367
391
6.18
382
10.4
2.71

WDDL
7.53
121.78
93.82
58.51
51.71
90.08

2N2P
7.37
22.1
66.7
14.8
8.32
56.1

CAL
13.8
29.7
53.4
21.5
8.84
41.1

IDPAL
7.06
15.2
53.5
11.2
4.55
40.7

State-of-the-art secure logic families like SABL and WDDL were shown to be either
effective in preventing power analysis attacks but consume a significant amount of energy
(in the case of SABL) or significantly ineffective but consume a lower amount of energy
(in the case of WDDL). Neither family fit the requirement of both low power and security
mainly because both families are derived from traditional CMOS circuits, which do not
provide a secure solution against this kind of attacks as we observed in the case of the
CMOS inverter. Therefore, further analysis on secure low-power solutions focuses on
adiabatic circuits only, which were shown to be low power and some provide resistance
to power analysis attacks.
An additional analysis of the 2-input NAND gate can be done using the Hamming

Weight/Distance power models for the NAND gates above. For this experiment, a twoinput IDPAL NAND/AND gate has been cycled through all 16 possible input combina
tions shown in Table 7 to account for both the Hamming Weight and Hamming Distance
power models. Simulations were performed with the same parameters as before, but using
a 10MHz PC to observe the decrease in current magnitudes at a lower frequency. Addi
tionally, energy values for each transition were calculated to obtain a clearer picture of the
energy imbalances.
Table 7: All 16 possible input transitions for a 2-input NAND/AND gate and energy
consumption values for each transition in IDPAL.
Current
00
00
00
00
01
01
01
01
10
10
10
10
11
11
11
11

Next
00
01
10
11
00
01
10
11
00
01
10
11
00
01
10
11

Energy (fj)
4.11
4.76
4.78
7.33
4.75
4.12
4.71
4.77
4.74
4.80
4.09
4.75
4.78
4.73
7.48
4.13

Figure 34 shows an overlay of the 16 current traces for this experiment. A visual
inspection of the traces reveals that two of the 16 traces have peaks that are around 2x
larger than other peaks. The input transitions causing these peaks are “00” —> “ 11” and
“11”

“10”, the same two transitions that produced higher peaks in Figure 32. Similarly,

more significant peaks were observed in the 2N2P and CAL NAND gates for the same
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input transitions.
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Fig. 34: Current traces for all 16 possible transitions for the DDPAL AND/NAND gate.

Applying the Hamming Weight model and comparing energy consumption of the 1
value that produce a Low value on the output of the NAND gate vs the 3 values that
produce a High value, an average energy consumption of 5.800 is achieved for the three
values, whereas the single Low-producing value uses 7.93fJ. The difference is significant
(27%), however it is due to only one of the values producing a Low output. This imbalance
can allow an attacker to extract the fact that the inputs to the 2-input NAND gate were “ 11”
if only one gate is under attack, although this situation is improbable and does not produce
any useful information about the circuit, a larger circuit would need to be analyzed to
observe the ability of this model to predict the input values.
The Hamming Distance model used on the 16 transitions listed above is expected to
give a more accurate representation of the energy consumption for each transition since
the average will depend on more than one output value. Of the 16 outputs, ten have a
Hamming Distance of 0 and six have a Hamming Distance of 1. The average energy
consumption for the distance = 0 outputs is 4.49 fJ, whereas the average for distance = 1
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is 5.64 fj, a difference of only 1.15fJ. The larger energy consumption for the distance = 1
transitions is due to the two peak values being part of this average, otherwise the two
average values would have been almost equal. The smaller difference in the case of the
Hamming Distance model shows that IDPAL is able to successfully reduce the amount of
information that can be extracted by analyzing the energy consumption of a circuit.

IV.4

Results for Large Circuits

Large circuits have been simulated and analyzed for resistance against power analysis
attacks. Attacks on larger adiabatic circuits have to take into account the leakage from
other PC’s as the circuits will contain more than one evaluation stages. If the number
of evaluation stages is odd, one of the PC current traces can be larger than the others.
Other factors, such as the use of unequal number of gates and different types of gates for
different evaluation stages, will affect the magnitude of the current trace for a given PC.
To illustrate the issue of having a different number of evaluation stages for each PC,
two simple simulations were performed with a chain of 4 and 5 IDPAL buffer/inverters.
Since all gates are of the same type, the difference between the current traces between
the first and second experiment should not be very large, but it should be visible. Current
traces for each experiment are shown in Fig. 35. Results show that ipc in the second
experiment is approximately 200nA larger than the same trace in the first experiment
since it drives 3 evaluation stages vs. 2 in the first experiment. It can also be observed that
ipc stays constant since it does not drive any additional gates in the second experiment.
It would be possible to almost equalize two current traces in a larger circuit by adding
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buffers to the circuit, but doing so would affect the energy efficiency as well as circuit
area. Current trace inequality is an issue in any adiabatic logic family using more than a
single phase, but no significant information can be extracted from this fact except that one
phase of the PC drives more transistors than the other(s).
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Fig. 35: Current traces for even (4) vs. odd number (5) of evaluation stages for IDPAL
inverters.

A larger experiment consisted of simulating 8-, 16-, and 32-bit KSAs using the same
parameters with PC's running at 10MHz. As the state space even for the 8-bit KSA is very
large (65,536 total possible transitions) and increases exponentially with the adder width,
results from only a few representative and a few random inputs are shown in this section.

The values for the two inputs and the carry-in signals used in the 32-bit KSA are given in
Table 8.
Table 8: Input test cases for the 32-bit KSA and Wallace multiplier.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

A
B
Cin
A
B
Cin
A
B
Cin
A
B
Cin
A
B
Cin
A
B
Cin
A
B
Cin
A
B
Cin

00000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
0
00000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
1
11111111111111111111111111111111
11111111111111111111111111111111
0
11111111111111111111111111111111
11111111111111111111111111111111
1
00000000000000000000000000000000
11111111111111111111111111111111
0
11111111111111111111111111111111
00000000000000000000000000000000
1
01010101010101010101010101010101
10101010101010101010101010101010
0
11110000111100001111111100000000
01101001011010101111111111111111
1

Average current along with standard deviations at each data point between the 8 input
cases from the 32-bit KSA for 2N2P, CAL, and IDPAL are shown in Fig. 36. Large current
differences between different inputs would be an indication of lower resistance to power
analysis attacks and leakage of more information. Standard deviation values among the 8
current waveforms from one PC of each family are shown in Table 9. Average values for
the standard deviation are 3.24/iA for IDPAL, 3.07/iA for 2N2P, and 10.45juA for CAL.
The average standard deviation is slightly lower for 2N2P compared to IDPAL most likely

because of the higher number of clock phases used in 2N2P and more homogeneous gates
on each phase of the PC. The same observation can be made between IDPAL and CAL,
although the difference in the averages is significantly higher in this case. The range of
the standard deviation in the current traces for IDPAL is also lower than the other two
families and the reason is thought to be a more gradual and longer charging period due to
using a sinusoidal PC in IDPAL.

Table 9: Minimum, maximum, and average standard deviation values for current wave
forms for a 32-bit KSA in the adiabatic families tested.
Family
IDPAL
2N2P
CAL

Standard Deviation (A)
Min
Max
Average
3.8E-10 1.02E-5 3.24E-6
7.4E-8
1.4E-5 3.07E-6
1.7E-8 1.00E-4 1.05E-5

The largest differences among the 8 input cases were observed in test case pairs (1,4)
and (5, 6) for all three families, however, these differences were relatively small. These
imbalances are most likely due to the number of bits switching values, leading to the con
clusion that adiabatic logic families offer some resistance, but an attacker with extremely
sophisticated tools might be able to extract some information from a running circuit. Addi
tionally, the 32-bit KSA contains 7 evaluation stages, which results in differences between
the current traces of each PC in IDPAL and 2N2P. For IDPAL, the first PC drives 4 evalu
ation stages with a total of 2418 transistors, whereas the second PC drives the remaining
3 stages with 1932 transistors. This imbalance results in a difference of the current peaks
between the two P C s of approximately 300/tA, which is proportional to the difference in
the number of transistors. The only information that can be extracted from this imbalance
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without any knowledge about the circuit implementation is that one phase of the circuit
powers more transistors than the other. Additional security metrics information would be
needed in order to stage an attack on a given circuit.
The figures of merit NSD and NED were also calculated and the results are shown in
Table 10. Simulation results show that the average energy for CAL is highest whereas it
is lowest for IDPAL, results which were expected from Chapter III. IDPAL also has the
lowest NED and NSD values (5.83% and 2.03%, respectively). These results are a direct
consequence of having a smaller range for the minimum and maximum energy values and
energy standard deviation. This implies that IDPAL has the highest energy efficiency and
resistance against power analysis attacks among the tested adiabatic logic families.

Table 10: Security metrics for the 32-bit KSA for each adiabatic logic family.

Emin[pJ]
Emax[pi]
NED[%]
£[pJ]
<*E[pJ]
NSD[%]

CAL
1.52
1.66
8.65
1.60
0.05
3.30

2N2P
1.18
1.27
7.01
1.23
0.03
2.88

IDPAL
0.69
0.73
5.83
0.70
0.01
2.03

A 32-bit Wallace multiplier was also simulated and security metrics are shown in
Table 11. The NSD and NED values for IDPAL were significantly lower than for 2N2P
and CAL most likely due to the more even distribution of the types of gates in the 32-bit
multiplier between the two PC phases. Since the multiplier contains 16 evaluation stages,
each PC phase for a logic family controls an equal number of evaluation stages. This
aids in helping equalize energy dissipation for each phase, although variations in the type
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Fig. 36: Average and standard deviation current traces for 8 test cases of a 32-bit KSA in
CAL, 2N2P, and IDPAL for one of the PCs.
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of gates in each evaluation stage may cause an unequal amount of energy dissipation.
The 2N2P multiplier saw an increased variation in the energy consumption for each PC
phase because all phases controlled more than one evaluation stages containing different
gates. Compared to the 32-bit KSA, the NSD and NED for IDPAL for the 32-bit Wallace
multiplier was only slightly higher, most likely due to the different types of gates drive by
each phase of the PC, however IDPAL showed a lower variation in the amount of energy
usage compared to other adiabatic implementations.

Table 11: Security metrics for the 32-bit Wallace multiplier for each adiabatic logic family.

Emin CpJ]
Emax [pJ]
NED[%]
E[pJ]
CtetpJ]
NSD[%]

IV.5

CAL
16.34
18.06
9.52
17.31
0.69
4.04

2N2P
12.35
13.52
8.65
12.92
0.43
3.36

IDPAL
7.39
7.85
5.86
7.61
0.18
2.30

Chapter Conclusions

This chapter explored several power analysis attack metrics applied to adiabatic and
non-adiabatic circuits to measure hardware security of these circuits. It was experimen
tally shown that CMOS logic does not fit the requirements for a low-power and secure
circuit design due to its very large differences in energy usage, demonstrating the need
for more secure circuits styles. SABL and WDDL were explored in small-circuit sim
ulations, but shown to have large energy consumption, making them unsuitable for use
in a low power environment. SABL has very good security metrics (NSD=2.71%), but
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very large energy consumption, whereas WDDL has better energy characteristics but high
variability in energy consumption (NSD=95.2%). Adiabatic logic families showed lower
energy consumption characteristics and good resistance to power analysis attacks. IDPAL
has the lowest variability in energy consumption (NSD=2.03% and NED=5.83%) for a
large adder, making it a suitable candidate for low power secure circuit applications.
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CHAPTER V
DESIGN OF PROOF OF CONCEPT MICROPROCESSOR
This chapter presents the design of a proof of concept hybrid adiabatic-CMOS micro
processor. The bus width will be kept generic to the extent possible. Aspects that can be
customized will be highlighted and implementation sizes will be estimated for different
implementation configurations. All internal logic building blocks have an adiabatic imple
mentation using IDPAL, while the controller, register file, and memory are implemented
using CMOS logic. The design of the microprocessor is not pipelined, but it can use the
micro-pipelining abilities of adiabatic logic.

V.l

Implementation Constraints and Customizable Features

The current implementation of the hybrid microprocessor is limited to the available die
space - a 5mm2 die in 0.5/on 3-metal 2-poly process. The goal of this proof-of-concept
microprocessor is to take advantage of the best features from adiabatic and CMOS logic
styles. Computation units with high switching activity (e.g. adder, shifter) are imple
mented in IDPAL, whereas units with low switching activity (e.g. controller, memory)
are implemented using CMOS logic. This hybrid design presents several implementation
constraints, but also offers many customization options.
The microprocessor is a reduced version of an OpenRISC microprocessor with a basic
set of instructions in a load/store architecture. The design was based on the need for a
general purpose processor capable of performing integer and logical operations as well
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as implementing encryption algorithms using basic instructions. Further, this particular
design was selected because the Reduced Instruction Set Computing (RISC) paradigm
results in simpler data paths and control logic. The proposed microprocessor has many
features typical of an implementation of a smartcard microprocessor, adapted for the con
straints imposed by die size.
As noted, the microprocessor configuration will depend on the resources that are avail
able for implementation. In particular, the silicon area will be used to assess the actual
configuration implemented. Among the customizable features are the bus width, number
of registers, and the complexity of the instruction set. This reduced implementation also
does not include a multiplication and division unit or a floating point unit. Multiplication
operations can be implemented as a series additions at the expense of a larger number of
clock cycles. Division operations can be implemented using shift, subtract, and compari
son operations, all of which are available in this implementation. The number of registers
is at least 8, although a 16-register register file (RF) would be more optimal. The register
can be implemented using a 3-ported SRAM cell, with 2 read and 1 write ports.

V.2 Hybrid Microprocessor Design Issues

A hybrid microprocessor design allows for great flexibility in the implementation of
each block but also presents issues of compatibility and interfacing between each logic
block. Since IDPAL and CMOS logic implementations are very different from each other
and use different types of clocking circuitry, it presents several issues related to the imple
mentation of the proposed hybrid microprocessor.
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One of the main issues stemming from using adiabatic logic is the dual-rail nature
of adiabatic circuits, where an output and its complement have to be made available for
computation. Since CMOS circuits are single-rail, the CMOS output will need to be
inverted to produce the additional complementary output required for interfacing to an
adiabatic cell. Being able to invert an input instead of needing to use double the circuitry
to calculate a complement makes a hybrid design very appealing and was one of the factors
used in the decision to implement a hybrid microprocessor. Gate delay from the inverted
output is not an issue in this case as IDPAL circuits start evaluating the outputs only when
Vpc > Vjn and it is highly unlikely that an inverter would present a considerable delay
that would affect operation.
Clock management and synchronization can be an issue in large circuits in a silicon
implementation since IDPAL uses a two-phase PC. This issue may not be too difficult to
overcome, as it would be possible to interleave the two clock phases in layout, either on
the same metal layer or different layers. Additionally, a two-phase sinusoidal PC design
might be helpful since the load is divided among the two phases instead of relying on
a single and deep square-wave clock distribution network, where clock skew issues are
a big concern. All signals being latched onto an adiabatic bus have to have the same
phase since all buses have to be synchronized for a signal to be transmitted correctly. If
a component contains an odd number of evaluation stages, a buffer stage can be inserted
in order to have its output driven by the required phase. Depending on the size of the
circuit, the additional buffering layer can cause a significant increase in the number of
transistors in the adiabatic implementation if a large number of units need to have their
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outputs buffered. Additionally, logic can be inserted to determine when a components has
finished evaluating its output in order for the circuit to continue executing other tasks.
One of the other issues in a hybrid adiabatic-CMOS processor is the interfacing be
tween the adiabatic and CMOS circuits. Special interfacing circuitry is required because
the circuit can produce invalid values if the output of an adiabatic gate is connected di
rectly to the input of a CMOS gate or flip-flop. Since adiabatic circuits are driven contin
uously by the PC, the output of an adiabatic gate will fall to

\V t p \

level when the PC is

at GND. This event will trigger a CMOS flip-flop to switch values, causing its output to
approximate the oscillating nature of adiabatic circuits by charging and discharging every
PC cycle. This solution is clearly inadequate and special circuitry needs to be constructed
to allow the flip-flop to operate similar to a CMOS flip-flop. Two CMOS inverters in
series have been reported to work as converters from a trapezoidal adiabatic input signal
to a square-wave output signal in [28]. However, due to the longer rise time of an adia
batic input, there is a large short-circuit current in the first inverter, causing a large energy
consumption.
A solution to the interfacing problem used in this work takes advantage of the dual
phase operation of IDPAL to produce a square-wave output. The flip-flop circuit does not
use any additional control signals and its implementation is composed of two modified
CMOS inverters connected in series. A diagram of the circuit is shown in Fig. 37. As
suming that the input in is controlled by PC, the interface circuit then has to be controlled
by the complementary phase, PC. When in is at GND and the PC is at GND and starts
rising towards Vj j , the intermediary output T takes on a High values since both PMOS
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transistors are ON. Once PC rises past the |V t p \ threshold, the output may no longer be
changed since the PMOS control transistor is OFF. When in is at V^d, the NMOS network
starts conducting once Vpc > Vtn, pulling the intermediary output T to GND. The PMOS
network is disconnected since in is at Vdd and does not have any influence on T. The inter
mediary output T is the converted and inverted version of the input in and approximates
a CMOS signal. However, due to the oscillating adiabatic input and PC, the intermediary
output contains small ripples, as illustrated in Fig. 38a. In order to obtain an equivalent
square-wave version of the original oscillating input signal without any ripples, the T sig
nal is then passed through a pure CMOS inverter, as shown in Fig. 38b. The input in in
the Figure has a 75% duty cycle to show the behavior of the adiabatic-CMOS interface
under both input cases. The use of the two control transistors controlled by PC removes
the large short circuit current by blocking the formation of a path from the PMOS to
NMOS transistors during switching and results in a better design for the adiabatic CMOS
interface.

in — PC

D

Fig. 37: An adiabatic-CMOS interface circuit used in the proposed microprocessor.
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Fig. 38: Output signal with and without ripples after conversion from an adiabatic input.
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This interface has the advantage of not needing any additional control circuitry other
than the signals already available. It also uses a small number of transistors in its im
plementation compared with other implementations [28], which increases its energy effi
ciency. The interface circuit was tested and shown to be operational on both trapezoidal
and sinusoidal PC’s, however its performance is better on a sinusoidal PC, where the
square-wave output is valid slightly earlier than on the trapezoidal PC. This difference is
mainly due to the earlier evaluation of sinusoidal PC’s compared to the trapezoidal ones.
A disadvantage of all adiabatic-CMOS interfaces encountered in literature, including
the one described above, is that due to the time-varying nature of the adiabatic input and
the PC’s, the square-wave output is only available approximately 1/4 of the way into a
PC cycle. The reason for the delay is that the adiabatic output only starts evaluating once
Vpc > |V7w|.
Because some of the operations in the microprocessor may not have a set number of
clock cycles required for execution (i.e. they are asynchronous), a fully adiabatic imple
mentation might not be the best solution due to its micro-pipelining. To accommodate
this issue, a square-wave implementation using a flip-flop is used in this microprocessor
for the memory read/write operations. The proposed approach uses the adiabatic-CMOS
interface circuit in order to generate a square-wave output signal to be written to memory.
When a memory operation is complete, a signal will be triggered to indicate the end of
the operation, allowing the next unit to continue evaluation using the new input.
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V.3

Implementation Details

The microprocessor block diagram is shown in Fig. 39. Dotted outlines show adia
batic implementations whereas solid outlines show CMOS implementations. There are a
few instances of the adiabatic-CMOS interface being used, denoted with an interrupted
outline. As can be observed, the ALU and all temporary registers are fully implemented
using EDPAL, whereas CMOS implementations include the register file, control circuitry,
and memory. A square-wave clock can be generated from either of the two adiabatic
phases by passing it through an instance of the adiabatic-CMOS interface presented ear
lier. The control circuitry is implemented as a hard-wired ROM due to the simplicity of
implementation. Although not shown in the Figure, the two source buses (SI and S2) are
driven by PC, whereas the destination bus (D) is driven by PC.
Due to the limited size of the implementation, the OpenRISC instruction set was re
duced to only the most basic instructions that would allow implementation to be charac
terized as OpenRISC also being able to implement an encryption algorithm. A description
of the building blocks of the proposed microprocessor follows.
The Program Counter (PC, not to be confused with PC —the Power Clock) uses an
adiabatic buffer for storage of the next instruction address. A buffer is inserted between
the D bus and the PC in order to have the correct phase drive the PC on the SI and S2
buses. The ALU has pass-through capability in order to allow the value from PC (or any
other value from the SI and S2 buses) to be passed onto the D bus.
The memory is CMOS-based and is hosted off-chip due to limited die space. An
additional off-chip square-wave clock is used for control along with any other memory
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Fig. 39: Block diagram of the hybrid adiabatic-CMOS microprocessor.
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control signals coming from the chip. If the memory were to be placed on chip, an adi
abatic implementation similar to the one in [30] could be used. The memory has to be
byte-addressable in order to be able to execute instructions that operate on single bytes.
As the proposed microprocessor does not contain advanced features, the memory contains
both instruction and program data. Additionally, no cache or memory management units
are implemented in order to maintain the simplicity of this proof-of-concept implementa
tion.
Although the microprocessor is not pipelined, we can take advantage of the micro
pipelining abilities of adiabatic logic if multiple instructions of the same type are executed
consecutively. For example, in an encryption operation, many shift, XOR, and multiply
operations take place. In a micro-pipelined environment, the results of these operations
could be available one per PC cycle once the first result is available, assuming that the
operations are independent of each other. Encryption operations and some digital signal
processing operations could make use of this micro-pipelining feature of adiabatic cir
cuits to obtain results faster than performing individual instructions sequentially. If the
operations are not independent, issues that affect regular pipeline operations have to be
considered before implementation (e.g. data hazards).

V.3.1

Implementation of Main Instructions

For demonstration purposes, the following discussion is based on an 8-bit implemen
tation of the hybrid microprocessor. The discussion can be extended to a 16- or 32-bit
implementation without many changes. All instructions follow the same execution stages
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as a in a traditional CMOS non-pipelined implementation, although the ALU has micro
pipelining abilities due to using IDPAL for implementation.
Addition and subtraction operations are implemented using an 8-bit KSA, similar to
the one discussed in Chapter ID. A block diagram for the ALU is shown in Fig. 40. Unlike
traditional adder/subtractors, where a XOR gate is used in conjunction with the Cin signal
to generate the inverted version of one of the inputs, adiabatic logic signals have both
the input and its complement available and only need to have different routing paths. A
swap gate that has the functionality of a 2-bit multiplexer, implemented as a 2-input XOR
gate using 10 transistors (Fig. 41), is inserted before the KSA in order to account for the
subtraction operation. This gate is controlled by a signal which allows the inputs to be
swapped when it is asserted. The second input is presented in its regular form and needs
to be buffered for an additional stage due to the swap gate. The overhead associated with
the subtraction operation then becomes 16 transistors for each input bit pair for a total
of 128 transistors, or 14% of the total number of transistors in an adder/subtractor. The
8-bit KSA had 5 evaluation stages before the addition of the layer of swap gates, which
requires a stage of buffers at the output of the adder in order to synchronize its outputs
with the bus. Thus, the addition of the swap gates stage adds the extra evaluation stage
that synchronizes the outputs as well as provides the subtractor functionality, allowing for
an even lower overhead compared with a pure adder.
An improvement over this design would be to have logic that reads the next instruction
in the micro-pipeline and is able to detect whether it is a subtraction operation or not. If
the next instruction is a subtraction, then the results of the current instruction, regardless
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Fig. 40: High-level ALU block diagram implementation.
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Fig. 41: Implementation of a 2-input XOR gate in DDPAL used as a swap gate.
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of what it is, can be routed to opposite registers in the register banks using two 2-to1 multiplexers, thus swapping the input values with their complements and eliminating
the need for a new layer of logic in the KSA. Due to the additional transistors used in
multiplexers, a more detailed analysis of the particular use of this microprocessor would
need to be performed in order to choose the most optimal implementation. Additionally,
this design would not be feasible on the current version of the microprocessor as the KSA
needs to produce a result in an even number of phases.
Shift instructions (SRL,SRA,SLL,ROR) are implemented using a bi-directional barrel
shifter implemented with modified 8-to-1 and 4-to-1 multiplexers. A diagram of the shifter
design is shown in Fig. 42. The 4-to-l multiplexers form the majority of the multiplexers
used and only use 3 inputs, whereas the 8-to-l multiplexers only use 5 inputs. The rest of
the available inputs to each kind of multiplexer are “don’t cares” as their values will not
influence the output of each multiplexer and are not shown in the diagrams for simplicity.
The few 8-to-l multiplexers used are needed in order to shift constant values for some
of the instructions that do not have a more regular structure. The control signals Sxo and
Sxi , where x = 0,1,2, are the same for both types of multiplexer and the signal Sx2 is only
used for the 8-to-l multiplexers for the non-regular cases. An additional layer of buffers
is required at the shifter output in order to use an even number of clock phases for correct
operation. The first input to each type of multiplexer allows the previous input to pass
through the multiplexer unchanged. The second input produces the ROR operation, as
well as SRL and SRA on the 4-to-l multiplexers. These two instructions are different on
the 8-to-l multiplexer as a 0 needs to be shifted in for the SRL operation (input 5) and

the value of the first bit needs to be shifted in for the SRA operation (input 4). The third
input on both multiplexers is for the SUL operation, which has hard-wired connections
to GND for the lowest bit positions and the multiplexers do not require any additional
modifications.
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Fig. 42: An 8-bit bi-directional barrel shifter implementing the SRL, SRA, SLL, ROR
instructions.

Comparison operations use a special 5-bit status register to store the result of a com
parison operation. Several hardware comparator options were available, although due to
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space constraints it was decided to use the 8-bit KSA implemented earlier with a few mod
ifications to account for comparison operations. Comparison can be implemented using a
KSA performing a subtraction operation. Assuming the subtraction operation is A —B, to
check if A > B or A < B, we check the carry-out (Cout) signal of the KSA. If CoM = 1, then
A > B, otherwise A < B. To check for equality (A = B), we check the Cout and also pass
the output through an OR gate and check the result. If Cout = 1 and the OR gate result
is a 0, then A = B. Since the A = B operation involves two steps, it adds two layers of
logic to the computation. The other two comparison operations (A > B and A < B ) can be
implemented from the two basic operations A < B and A > B, respectively, by inverting
their values.
Load and store instructions use an instance of the adiabatic-CMOS interface described
earlier and a flip-flop in order to have a strong CMOS signal to write to and read from the
memory. Address and data to be written are stored in MAR and MDR, respectively. An
additional buffer was inserted between the D bus and the MAR for synchronization with
the operation of MDR due to the 2-to-l multiplexer. Memory is off-chip and is clocked
using a separate clock running at the same frequency as the PC. Data is loaded from the
MDR into the flip-flop by using a memory control signal supplied by the controller, which
is then written to memory in the next clock cycle. The micro-pipeline can be padded with
enough buffers in order to match the memory access time and avoid using more complex
control circuitry, e.g. an interrupt. A similar scenario takes place during a load instruction
and an interrupt is triggered when the load operation is complete. The PC and memory
clocks do not have to be synchronized as the flip-flop load signal and the memory write
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signal will be spaced by 1 clock cycle, allowing the address and data to be written to flipflops and then available for the memory in the next clock cycle. Since the micro-pipeline
depth will match the required access times for a read operation, available data can be
passed to the multiplexer to be loaded into the MDR during the next PC cycle
Basic branching instructions also are implemented in this microprocessor. Uncondi
tional branches are implemented by simply latching the address of the next instruction in
the PC register. Conditional branching instructions using the results of conditional set-flag
instructions can be readily implemented using the flags in the special 5-bit status register
and multiplexers. Other branching instructions (e.g. jump-and-link) will contain special
control circuitry in the controller to achieve their particular implementations.

V.4 Microprocessor Testing

The proposed microprocessor has been tested in VHDL for behavioral and dataflow
functionality. It is currently in layout stage using the Cadence layout suite in preparation
for fabrication in silicon. Rigorous testing on the energy efficiency and hardware security
of the microprocessor will begin once fabricated parts are available.
Several steps need to be taken before testing of the fabricated parts is possible. First,
a special test fixture that will be able to supply the clocking information for the PC and
PC to the microprocessor needs to be developed. The test fixture will contain circuitry
necessary for the generation the two PC phases (either a RLC circuit or a phase-locked
loop circuit) tuned to the specifications of the microprocessor extracted from layout. It
is expected that the microprocessor will be tested in the 10-100 MHz frequency range,
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so an appropriate oscilloscope will need to be used to properly sample signals from the
microprocessor. Second, an external memory capable of running at the specified speeds
will need to be acquired and the appropriate memory control signals, including a new
square-wave clock, will need to be generated.
The fabricated microprocessor will be evaluated using programs ranging from a simple
logical operation to a full state-of-the-art encryption algorithm (e.g. DES, AES). Energy
efficiency will be tested from measurements only on the two clock phases (PC and PC)
as the square-wave clock is not part of the adiabatic implementation. An accurate 1£1
resistor will be placed in series with the PC line in order to measure the current supplied
and recovered in the circuit.

V.5

Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter, a new hybrid adiabatic-CMOS microprocessor partially implemented
using IDPAL was proposed. A general description of the microprocessor using a block
diagram and a more detailed explanation of each block was given. The chapter also de
scribed an adiabatic-CMOS interface circuit capable of producing square-wave outputs
from oscillating inputs using a small number of transistors without any external signals.
Due to the limitation on the size of the die for fabrication, a memory was not implemented
in the proposed microprocessor, but an interface for using external memory was described.
A short summary of the implementation of the main instructions was presented, giv
ing a more detailed view of the arithmetic unit. It was shown that for correct operation of
the ALU, each internal component has to produce an output in an even number of clock

intervals, which is due to the source (51 and 52) and destination (D) buses being operated
using opposite phases. In many cases this restriction is not a limiting factor in the perfor
mance of the microprocessor as many of the instructions already use an even number of
clock intervals. A large number of more complex instructions can be implemented using
the basic instructions described in this chapter, although their implementation will take
more clock cycles than having specialized hardware for specific instructions. Overall, the
proposed microprocessor makes use of the advantages of adiabatic logic for circuits with
high switching activity and uses CMOS logic for the other circuits.
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CHAPTER VI
FUTURE WORK
This dissertation presented promising results which can be implemented successfully
in the design of larger low-power adiabatic circuits. IDPAL has been tested in large circuit
simulations as described in previous chapters and its energy efficiency scaled well with
increased circuit size. This work could be further expanded to the implementation of a
32-bit RISC processor using IDPAL. Previous adiabatic processors were fabricated at 8and 16-bit length [33]-[36], which do not offer a full range of options for testing the
processor against standard benchmarks. A 32-bit processor would allow for an equal
comparison with equivalent commercial processors. The proof of concept microprocessor
can be implemented without any pipelining in order to confirm energy energy efficiency in
silicon, with subsequent pipelined versions fabricated in the future. The processor could
implement encryption operations using a provided instruction set and/or a dedicated AES
cryptographic co-processor could be implemented in hardware. Implementing encryption
using two different ways allows for a more in-depth comparison of energy efficiency and
power analysis attack resistance both in a RISC and an ASIC. A fabrication run would
also yield more than one processor, so an extension to this work can be an analysis of
multiple dies to be able to gauge inter-die variations and their effects on energy efficiency
and power analysis attack resistance.
The arithmetic units in this work (adder and multiplier) were implemented and trans
lated from their CMOS implementation manually. An extension to this work would be to
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create an automatic translation tool for converting single-rail CMOS designs (from VHDL
code or netlists) to any type of adiabatic logic family given the details of a particular fam
ily and other design criteria. The tools should be able to optimize a design based on area
or energy usage and any other constraints set by the designer.
IDPAL circuit scalability has only been investigated at 180nm and it was found that it
scales similar to CMOS and other adiabatic implementations between these two adjacent
technology nodes. An extension of this work would be to compare energy efficiency in
more modem processes in the deep-sub-micron region (e.g. 22nm, 16nm) and analyze
power analysis resistance at these technology nodes. Leakage currents are very strong
and leakage power is often a very large contributor to the overall power dissipation at
these feature sizes. An analysis at this level would also allow for the implementation of
leakage power analysis attacks.
Sequential circuits were not investigated in most adiabatic logic families encountered
in literature due to the micro-pipelining abilities of adiabatic logic. The few attempts
that were made used only modified buffer designs and did not contain special circuitry
for stand-alone latches and flip flops. One of the disadvantages of relying on micro
pipelining is the inability of buffers to hold a value when the buffer input is disconnected
by a control transistor and such a case would require special circuitry for a self-sustaining
adiabatic flip-flop. New control circuitry would need to be developed in order to interface
the flip-flops with the rest of the adiabatic circuit and with square-wave output circuitry
for energy-efficient operation.

The ultimate goal of this work is to help design a framework for cost-effective, re
liable, and secure identification, monitoring, and tracking system which could be used
in hospital environments. Current technology, starting from hospital admission to drug
delivery and monitoring to discharge paperwork, is very convoluted and time-consuming
and ends up in discomfort to the patient, missed procedures, and reduced efficiency. A
vision for the future is to use IDPAL in smart cards, sensors, and implantable medical de
vices for better and secure patient care and decreased costs. Smart cards could be used for
patient identification by storing patient information, health history, and other patient data
locally and securely. This approach would allow for much shorter admission times and
more immediate care. Sensors could monitor patient movement throughout the hospital,
drug admission and patient response, and securely make the data available to attending
doctors. Finally, implantable medical devices, such as pacemakers, can transmit real-time
data to the doctor, their batteries can last a longer time, and die devices themselves be
secure against power analysis attacks. Overall, adoption of next-generation technology,
including circuits implemented using IDPAL, can provide for more immediate care for
patients, decrease hospital and patient costs, and increase security of both devices and
patient information.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation presented IDPAL - a new very low power partially-adiabatic logic
family. The unique feature of IDPAL is in the decoupling of input networks from the
evaluation networks, which allows the input stack to evaluate the inputs to the evaluation
network long before the evaluation stage is enabled. This gate design was shown to reduce
energy consumption compared to equivalent CMOS circuits by up to 79% and at least by
25% than other state-of-the-art adiabatic logic families in large circuits (32-bit adder and
multiplier). IDPAL circuits continue to maintain their energy advantage with circuit scal
ing. In an experiment where minimum feature size was reduced from 250nm to 180nm,
an IDPAL 32-bit adder scaled similar to CMOS circuits and other adiabatic circuits.
IDPAL also has good power analysis attacks resistance characteristics due to its
almost-constant energy dissipation for any input combination. In small circuit simula
tions, all adiabatic logic families tested showed a larger normalized energy deviation than
state-of-the-art secure logic families. However, since the adiabatic families studied have
a much smaller absolute magnitude deviation, they are a better choice for implementation
of power analysis attack resistant circuits. The energy deviation between maximum and
minimum values is 17/iA lower for IDPAL than SABL, which can increase the resistance
of IDPAL against power analysis attacks. When compared to other adiabatic logic fami
lies, IDPAL increases power analysis attack resistance by at least a 32%. These qualities
allow IDPAL to be used as a low power power analysis attack countermeasure.
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A hybrid adiabatic-CMOS microprocessor implemented using IDPAL for the adia
batic circuits was also proposed. The microprocessor takes advantage of the reduced en
ergy consumption of IDPAL circuits for circuit blocks with high switching activity (e.g.
ALU) and uses CMOS circuits for circuit blocks with lower switching activity (e.g. con
troller, memory). An adiabatic-CMOS interface circuit that operates without any external
signals to convert an adiabatic signal to a square-wave signal was also discussed.
The use of IDPAL in low power circuits could extend the life of battery-powered de
vices, avoid expensive and dangerous surgeries in the case of implantable medical devices,
and provide a cheaper solution for fault-tolerance applications. Given that adiabatic cir
cuits are more suitable for medium to high switching activity applications, some other
applications include digital signal processors, sensor networks, and displays.
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